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Today wireless communications offer great convenience and efficiency, but 
concerns about security must be addressed. Wireless communications are 
considered less secure than wired or fiber-based systems because the data is 
transmitted over the radio channel making it more susceptible to eavesdropping 
and interception. Thus, security needs special attention. Confidentiality, integrity 
and availability are the objectives of security solutions. Attacks such as Man-in-
the-Middle, replay, and Denial-of-Service are mitigated or eliminated by solutions 
such as those discussed in this thesis. Data disclosure to unauthorized people, 
user identity and location disclosure, impersonation of a valid user, user tracking 
and subscriber capabilities disclosure are a few of the potential risks that can 
lead to a mission failure and even cost people’s lives. 
This thesis explores how to securely leverage three cellular technologies, 
3G, 4G/LTE and WiMAX, through an analysis of their security features. The 
security architectures of these wireless technologies are described. Their security 
vulnerabilities and the potential attack vectors are analyzed. A few protocols and 
techniques that address or mitigate the security deficiencies and the way they 
enforce security are provided. Furthermore, the importance of security in military 
communications is considered. 
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A. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
The popularity and availability of wireless communications, particularly 
cellular, continues to grow rapidly world-wide.  Mobile users are interested in 
services such as mobile shopping, mobile banking and mobile payments. 
Multimedia applications, high data rate, mobility, and cost make wireless 
communication one of the most useful means of communication. In the military, 
wireless communications support mobility and provide flexibility for troops on the 
battlefield or ships at sea, enabling them to communicate with command 
elements or higher headquarters. 
Even though wireless communications offer great convenience and 
efficiency, concerns about security must be addressed. Wireless communications 
are considered less secure than wired or fiber-based systems because the data 
is transmitted over the radio channel making it more susceptible to 
eavesdropping and interception. Thus, security needs special attention. 
Confidentiality, integrity and availability are the objectives of security solutions. 
Attacks such as Man-in-the-Middle, replay, and Denial-of-Service are mitigated 
or eliminated by solutions such as those discussed in this thesis. Data disclosure 
to unauthorized people, user identity and location disclosure, impersonation of a 
valid user, user tracking and subscriber capabilities disclosure are a few of the 
potential risks that can lead to a mission failure and even cost people’s lives. 
This thesis explores how to securely leverage three cellular technologies 
through an analysis of their security features. The security architectures of these 
wireless technologies are described. Their security vulnerabilities and the 
potential attack vectors are analyzed. A few protocols and techniques that 
address or mitigate the security deficiencies and the way they enforce security 
are provided. Furthermore, the importance of security in military communications 
is considered. 
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B. THESIS OBJECTIVES 
The main question that is addressed in this research is: “What are the 
improvements needed in order to securely leverage the 3G, 4G/LTE, and WiMAX 
cellular communications?” 
Corollary questions to be answered in pursuit of this question are as 
follows: 
• What security challenges do these wireless technologies pose? 
• What potential security-related attacks could be mounted against 
these wireless technologies? 
• What is the impact of the security vulnerabilities for military 
communications? 
• In what ways may attackers be prevented from causing harm to 
communications by the solutions suggested?  
For each technology, the report provides background information pertinent 
to the specific security architecture and associated vulnerabilities. Then solutions 
that address these vulnerabilities are discussed and analyzed. Finally, the 
potential impact of the vulnerabilities on military applications is analyzed and the 
benefits of applying the suggested solutions are presented.  
C. THESIS OUTLINE 
The thesis is organized into the following chapters: 
• Chapter II describes the basic concepts and terminology and 
provides the necessary theoretical background by analyzing the 
security architectures of the three technologies. 
• Chapter III describes the vulnerabilities and potential attacks that 
may be mounted, the suggested solutions and their method of 
enforcing security for these technologies. 
• Chapter IV analyzes the suggested solutions and the security 
challenges they address, as well as provides the security benefits 
of security measures for military communications. 
• Chapter V summarizes the analytical results and makes 
recommendations for future work. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND CURRENT CAPABILITIES 
A. OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT WIRELESS NETWORKING 
TECHNOLOGIES 
When talking about security in a mobile system, a few objectives come to 
mind. First, one must ensure that only legitimate users have access to the mobile 
system. Second, effort must be made to maintain a user’s or operator’s data 
confidentiality and integrity. Third, protection from denial of service (that is, 
assurance of user access) must be provided. Finally in the event of loss or theft 
of end-user devices, remote access by the administrators must be assured to 
maintain the mobile system’s security [1]. 
This chapter provides information regarding the security architecture of 
Third Generation (3G), Long Term Evolution (LTE), and WiMAX cellular systems 
cellular systems. The background information will serve as a basis for the 
consideration of security threats and vulnerabilities of these wireless 
technologies. 
1. UMTS Security 
The Third Generation (3G) proposal for cellular communication aimed at 
maintaining compatibility with Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) 
as well as address security weaknesses of the GSM architecture. Some of 3G’s 
main security objectives include the following [2]: 
• Ensure that information generated by the user is protected against 
misuse or misappropriation. 
• Ensure that resources and services are protected adequately 
against misuse or misappropriation. 
• Ensure that the security features are globally compatible.  
• Protect the users in cases of stolen mobile stations or misused by 
monitoring their traffic and keeping track of mobile stations’ 
identities. 
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• Use shared symmetric key for challenge and response messages 
between the SIM card and the authentication center during 
authentication procedure. 
• Use unique user numbering, identification, and equipment during 
authentication. 
• Ensure that the security features can be extended and applied to 
new services. 
The Universal Mobile Telephone System (UMTS) security architecture, 
which is intended as a framework for implementing the previously stated 
objectives, is depicted in the following diagram. It is composed of five distinct 
security features/classes, as enumerated, which address specific threats and 
provide specific protection mechanisms for each threat. The key aspects of the 
five classes are discussed in the remainder of this section [1], [3]: 
 
 
Figure 1.  UMTS security architecture, from [3] 
• Network access security (class 1): enables the user to securely 
access a 3G network and provide protection from attacks on the 
(radio) access link.   
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• Network domain security (class 2): enables nodes in the provider 
domain to securely exchange signaling messages and provide 
protection from attacks on the wire-line network.   
• User domain security (class 3): allows only authorized access to 
mobile terminals.    
• Application domain security (class 4): ensures the secure message 
exchange between user and provider application domains. 
• Visibility and configurability of security (class 5): enables the user to 
be informed about which security features are in operation (and 
which are not) and which services are based on the security 
features.  
a. Network Access Security 
Network Access Security includes entity authentication, 
confidentiality, and data integrity functions [1, 3]. These functions refer to user 
identity confidentiality, authentication and key agreement and data confidentiality 
and integrity protection of signaling messages. 
(1) User Identity and Location Confidentiality. The user 
identity confidentiality feature prevents a user’s information and location 
disclosure. It specifically impedes passive user data eavesdropping to protect the 
user’s identity. The user is assigned a Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity 
(TMSI/P-TMSI) and is identified by the TMSI on the radio access link, except 
during the user’s first registration, where the TMSI is not generated until the user 
is verified by the permanent identity. The visited Location Register is responsible 
for tracking the mapping between the permanent (International Mobile Subscriber 
Identity (IMSI)) and temporary (TMSI) identity. Whenever a user changes a 
location the temporary identity is acquired from the previous VLR if possible; 
otherwise, the same procedure of permanent identity request is followed. 
Moreover, in order to avoid the compromise of a user’s identity and location, the 
temporary identity assigned to the user changes after a period of time, making it 
difficult for penetrators to track the user. Furthermore, any signaling message or 
user packet that may include information on user identity is encrypted by the 
radio interface. 
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Thus, in order to achieve user identity confidentiality, user 
location confidentiality and user intractability, a few features are used that are 
identical to those used on the GSM networks. First, the serving network enforces 
identification of the mobile equipment by requesting from terminal the mobile 
equipment’s IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity). A paradox is that the 
mobile IMEI cannot be verified because it is based on the terminal’s legitimacy, 
which provides the IMEI. Secondly, only authorized users have access to the 
Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM). The USIM is a memory component 
that stores subscriber information and customs settings on a SIM card. The 
authentication is enforced by using a shared secret key (personal identity 
number) that is stored securely in USIM; the user has to know it in order to 
authenticate. Lastly, a shared secret key between USIM and mobile terminal 
ensures that only the authorized USIM has the ability to access the mobile 
terminal [1, 3]. 
(2) Authentication and Key Agreement. The UMTS 
authentication and key agreement (AKA) [1, 3] achieves mutual authentication 
between the user and the serving network as well as the establishment of a 
cipher and integrity key. The authentication takes place in the USIM on the user 
side and in the HLR/AuC on the network side. The mechanism of AKA is 
depicted in the Figure 2. 
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Figure 2.  Authentication and key agreement, from [3]. 
Based on a challenge/response authentication protocol, the 
two involved parties do not reveal or transmit their secret password but use it in 
order to confirm the other party’s identity. The USIM uses a sequence counter, 
SQNMS, to show the highest sequence number the USIM has accepted during the 
network authentication procedure, and the home equipment uses another value, 
SQNHE, a unique sequence number for each individual user. Once VLR/SGSN 
makes an authentication request, the HLR/AuC responds by sending an array of 
“n” authentication vectors, which are ordered according to the sequence number. 
A random number, RAND, an expected response, XRES, a cipher key, CK, an 
integrity key, IK, and an authentication token, AUTN, comprise every 
authentication vector. 
The way the authentication vectors are generated is 
depicted in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.  Generation of authentication vectors, from [3]. 
The HLR/AuC generates a fresh (not previously used) 
sequence number, SQN, and a random unpredictable challenge value, RAND. 
Then, the rest of the components that compose the authentication vector are 
produced by using a set of functions, f1 through f5 that are described in detail in 
[4],, and the secret key, K, as follows [3]: 
• using a message authentication function, f1, it computes the 
message authentication code, MAC: 
MAC = f1 (K, SQN, RAND, AMF)      
where AMF is the authentication and key management field 
that is used to improve the performance or bring a new 
authentication key into use. 
• using a (possibly truncated) message authentication 
function, f2, it computes the expected response that is going 
to be compared later in the VLR/SGSN with the response 
received from MS: 
XRES= f2 (K, RAND)    
• using a key generating function, f3, it computes the cipher 
key, CK: 
CK = f3 (K, RAND)    
• using a key generating function, f4,  it computes the integrity 
key, IK: 
IK = f4 (K, RAND)    
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• using a key generating function, f5, it computes the 
anonymity key, AK: 
AK = f5 (K, RAND)     
• assembles the authentication token, AUTN, and updates the 
counter, SQNHE: 
AUTN = <SQN ⊕ AK, AMF, MAC>  
After all these components have been specified, the 
VLR/SGSN forwards parameters, RAND and AUTN, to the MS. The USIM, using 
the same secret key, K, computes the anonymity key,  
AK = f5 (K, RAND), 
and retrieves the SQN, 
SQN = (SQN ⊕ AK) xor AK. 
Then, USIM computes the expected message authentication code, XMAC, 
XMAC = f1 (K, SQN, RAND, AMF), 
and compares it with the MAC that is included in AUTN. If the AUTN and the 
SQN are accepted then USIM computes the response, RES, 
RES= f2 (K, RAND)  
and sends it to the VLR indicating a successful receipt. If MAC and XMAC are 
not the same, the MS abandons the procedure by sending back an 
authentication response message and stating that there is an integrity failure. If 
SQN is not acceptable, the MS abandons the procedure by sending back a 
synchronization failure response message and the computed re-synchronization 
token, AUTS.  
At the same time, the USIM computes the CK and IK, 
CK = f3 (K, RAND) 
IK = f4 (K, RAND). 
Finally, the VLR/SGSN compares the RES with the XRES and if they match the 
AKA is successful and it forwards the CK and IK to the ME and the 
corresponding radio network controller (RNC) to enforce encryption and integrity.  
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(3) Integrity Protection of Signaling Messages. This 
integrity protection mechanism of signaling messages [1, 3, 5] is depicted in the 
following figure:  
 
Figure 4.  Starting ciphering and integrity, from [1]. 
 
During Radio Resource Control (RRC) establishment, the 
ME sends the START values for the CS and PS domain and the UMTS 
Encryption algorithms (UEAMS) and integrity algorithms (UIAMS) to the RNC, 
informing the RNC regarding the ciphering and integrity capabilities of the ME. 
Then, the MS sends the Initial Layer 3 L3 message (location update request, 
routing area update request, paging response, etc.) to the VLR/SGSN, including 
the user identity and the Key Set Identifier (KSI), which is the one used during 
the last authentication. There may be an IMSI interrogation, user authentication, 
CK and IK production and a new KSI allocation required.  After VLR/SGSN 
specifies the allowed UEA and UIA to use, it starts the integrity and ciphering 
protection by sending the Radio Access Network Application Part (RANAP) 
message, called the Security Mode command, to the Serving Radio Network 
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Controller (SRNC).This is the first integrity protected message and contains the 
UIACN, the IK (the UEACN and the CK, if ciphering is starting, too). If a new key 
generation takes place, the START value should be reset. The SRNC selects the 
algorithms to use by checking from both the allowed and the MS capable 
algorithms, generates a FRESH value and starts the integrity protection. If there 
is a conflict with the data received from VLR/SGSN, then a security mode reject 
message is sent back. Thereafter, the SRNC computes the expected MAC and 
includes it with the UEAs and UIAs in the RRC message Security Mode 
command that is sent to the ME. Then the MS checks all the received security 
capabilities that are the common with those included in the initial message and 
generates and compares the MAC with the XMAC that it received. If all checks 
are satisfied a response message that Security Mode is complete is sent to 
SRNC, which in turn verifies the integrity and forwards it to the VLR/SGSN, 
including the selected algorithms [5]. 
In this manner, the integrity protection mechanism of 
signaling messages is enforced and does not permit malevolent entities to hijack 
the connection or spoof a message.  
(4) Signaling Data Integrity Mechanism. The function 
algorithm, f9, which is described in detail in [6] is used to protect against false 
base station attacks so that the receiving entity (MS or SN) is able to verify the 
message’s originality and non-modification (integrity). This algorithm implements 
the KASUMI algorithm and is based on a chain of block ciphers, whose 64-bit 
output is used to generate the 32-bit Message Authentication Code [1].  
The verification process takes place in the ME and in the 
RNC. At first, in the sender side a 32-bit MAC is computed based on the f9 
algorithm. In addition to the 128-bit integrity key, IK, and the variable length 
frame (MESSAGE), the f9 algorithm uses a time dependent 32-bit value, 
COUNT, a randomly generated 32-bit value, FRESH, and a 1-bit value, 
DIRECTION (showing the direction of transmission), to differentiate two identical 
messages [1]: 
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MAC = f9 (IK, MESSAGE, COUNT, FRESH, DIRECTION) 
 
 
Figure 5.  Air interface integrity mechanism, from [1]. 
 
The integrity check is completed in four steps [1]: 
• The f9 function computes the MAC based on the inputs and 
the MESSAGE. 
• The MAC is attached with the signal and sent to receiver. 
• The receiver computes the expected XMAC.   
• From the receiver side the integrity check is completed by 
the comparison of the received MAC and the calculated 
XMAC.  
(5) Air Interface Confidentiality Mechanism. The function 
algorithm, f8, which is described in detail in [6], is used to protect the user and 
signaling data that are exchanged between RNC and MS over the radio 
interface. The algorithm is a symmetric synchronous stream cipher that is used 
for encryption on the sender side as well as decryption on the receiver side. It is 
based on the KASUMI algorithm, which is analyzed in [7]. In addition to the 128-
bit cipher key, CK, and the variable length frame, called length, the f8 algorithm 
uses a time dependent 32-bit value, COUNT, a 5-bit bearer identity value, 
BEARER, and a 1-bit value, DIRECTION (showing the direction of transmission) 
to generate the output keystream block. The keystream has the same length as 
the original frame. The cipher-text is the result of a bitwise XOR operation 
between the plaintext and the keystream. 
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keystream = f8(CK, BEARER, DIRECTION, length) 
Cipher-text = keystream ⊕ plaintext 
The confidentiality mechanism consists of the following four 
steps [1]: 
• The f8 function computes the output keystream based on the 
inputs identified earlier. 
• The keystream is XORed with the plaintext to generate the 
resulting cipher-text. 
• The cipher-text is sent to the receiver through the radio 
interface. 
• On the receiver side, the keystream is computed the same 
way as on the sender side and by applying the bitwise XOR 
operation between it and the received cipher-text the 
plaintext is extracted. 
 
Figure 6.  Air Interface confidentiality mechanism, from [1]. 
b. Network Domain Security 
The Network Domain Security (NDS) [1, 3] offers security between 
entities that may be in the same or different networks. There are many different 
protocols and interfaces that may be used for network security, like Mobile 
Application Part (MAP) [8] and General Packet Radio Service tunneling (GPRS). 
Internet Protocol based security protocols (IPsec-based), which are applied at 
the network layer, and Signaling System No. 7 (SS7-based) protocols, which are 
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applied at the application layer, are based on the existing cryptographic 
techniques [1]. 
(1) IP-based protocols. In a UMTS network, usually the 
operators are related with a security domain. The security gateways (SEGs) are 
the entities at the border of the IP security domain that protect the IP-based 
protocols and all the traffic utilizing them. All the security domains make up the 
network domain security control plane, which is restricted to the network domain 
and does not provide protection to the user plane [1, 3]. 
The IP Security Association (SA) negotiations that take place 
between the Key Administration Centers (KAC) on behalf of the entities and 
security gateways are enforced through the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol 
and their distribution through standard interfaces. The 3GPP determined that 
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) should always be used for protection of 
the packets, which enforces both confidentiality and integrity protection, and 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) should be used as an encryption algorithm 
in internetworking solutions. For node authentication there are two options: pre-
shared symmetric keys or public key infrastructure. Lastly, the IPsec can be 
configured in transport and tunnel mode. The tunnel is preferred when one of the 
entities is a security gateway [1, 3]. 
There are two modes of enforcing the IP security [1]: 
• Hop by hop: distinct IPsec tunnels are established between 
every pair of network entities. That means the route that a 
message has to follow between two entities that are in 
different networks is the following: the sending entity 
establishes an IPsec tunnel to the SEG in its security domain 
and then forwards the data. Then the SEG terminates the 
tunnel, establishes a new one with the appropriate SEG in 
the network where the receiving entity belongs and sends 
the data. The receiving SEG now terminates the previous 
tunnel, establishing a new one with the receiving entity and 
forwards the data 
• end to end: in this mode the security association takes place 
between the sending and receiving entity, and it is applied 
even for entities within the same network. 
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(2) SS7- based protocols. When the traffic transport is 
based on the SS7 protocol only, or on a combination of SS7 and IPsec protocols, 
the security is enforced in the application layer. However, when it is based on 
IPsec only, the security is enforced either at the network layer only or in addition 
to the application layer. The mobile specific part of SS7 signaling is the MAP, and 
the complete set of procedures that enforce security for MAP messages is called 
the MAPsec. The MAPsec provides security by encrypting the original message 
and putting it in another MAP message and using a message authentication code 
generated for the original message and added in the new MAP message. The 
security association procedure at the application layer is network-based, similar 
to the one that was previously described for IP-based protocols. The SAs contain 
cryptographic keys and KACs are in charge of SA negotiations and distributions. 
Furthermore, the end-to-end solution enforces non-disclosure to entities other 
than the sender and the receiver [1, 3]. 
c. User Domain Security  
User Domain Security [1, 2, 3] consists of mechanisms that enforce 
secure access to mobile stations. The security relies on a removable card, called 
the UMTS integrated security card, and security applications, like USIM, CSIM 
(CDMA Subscriber Identity Module), or SIM, which all execute on this card. The 
USIM is the module through which user identification and association to home 
equipment is enforced, as noted earlier. For 3G networks, USIM is in charge of 
key agreement, as well as subscriber and network authentication. 
The User domain security contains two types of authentications: the 
user-to-USIM authentication and USIM-to-terminal authentication. The USIM 
gives access to a user (or users) after the user proves the knowledge of a shared 
secret key stored in the USIM. Moreover, only an authorized user is allowed to 
have access to other user equipment or to a terminal. A secret key that is shared 
between the USIM and the terminal and stored securely in both entities is used to 
enforce access control [2], [3]. 
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d. Application Domain Security  
The Application Domain Security [1, 2, 3] refers to the security of a 
message’s exchange between the mobile station and the serving network or 
service provider, whereas the network operator or the application provider 
chooses the security level. A user is allowed to use applications only after being 
authenticated. At the same time, application level confidentiality could also be 
enforced. Since USIM gives the opportunity to operators or third party providers 
to create an application, the secure exchange of messages should be ensured. 
This is achieved through numerous security mechanisms [2, 3]: 
• entity authentication of applications 
• message authentication 
• replay detection of application data 
• sequence integrity of application data 
• data integrity of application data 
• confidentiality assurance 
• proof of receipt 
These mechanisms are assigned and incorporated in the USIM 
Application Toolkit. The USIM Application Toolkit is in charge of the applications’ 
creation, which are resident on the USIM. All these security mechanisms at the 
application level are necessary so that protection is enforced, even if there is no 
end-to-end security mechanism enforced in lower layers. 
Two of the most popular application protocols, Wireless Application 
Protocol (WAP) and Wireless Application Protocol 2 (WAP 2.0) that include a set 
of standards for accessing information over mobile wireless networks, use two 
different mechanisms to achieve security in the communication. 
In WAP architecture, the WAP gateway translates the protocols 
used in the WAP segment to the protocols used in the public Internet, enabling 
the connection between the wireless domain and public Internet. As regards 
security, the Wireless Transport Layer Security (WTLS) protocol is used. Since it 
supports datagrams in low-bandwidth/high-latency environments, WTLS provides 
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an optimized handshake through dynamic key refreshing, which allows 
encryption keys to be regularly updated during a secure session. Thus, it is used 
to enforce data integrity, privacy, authentication and denial of service (DoS) 
protection. Therefore, the WAP gateway is in charge of managing wireless 
security and carrying secure data between WTLS and TLS security channels for 
Web applications that follow public Internet standards with TLS [2, 3.] 
In WAP2 architecture, the introduction of existing IP-stack protocols 
into the WAP-environment was the major difference from the original WAP 
architecture. This way, many different gateways are allowed, and the conversion 
between the protocol stacks is available anywhere. A TCP-level gateway allows 
wired and wireless versions of TCP respectively, and a Transport Layer Security 
TLS channel established between the mobile device, and the server runs on top 
of TCP. The wireless profile of TLS includes many security features, like cipher 
suites, signing algorithms, certificate formats and the use of session “resume.” 
Thus, taking advantage of these benefits, an end-to-end security capability is 
enforced at the transport level, making secure communication feasible [2, 3]. 
e. Visibility and Configuration of Security  
The features that belong to this class inform the users about which 
security features are effective (and which are not), as well as on which security 
features (if any) the use of particular services depends. Thus, the user should be 
offered visibility into operation of the security features, like indication of the 
access network encryption, the network wide encryption and the level of security 
provided [2, 3]. 
Moreover, the configurability offers the user and HE the opportunity 
to configure required features depending upon the service provisioning needed. It 
is obligatory for all security features upon which a required service depends to be 
in operation in order for the service to be available. Some of the configurability 
features include: enabling/disabling user-USIM authentication, 
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accepting/rejecting incoming non-ciphered calls, establishing non-encrypted calls 
and accepting/rejecting certain encryption algorithms [2, 3]. 
2. LTE Security  
LTE and WiMAX are both 4G wireless technologies. Relying on 3G, the 
designers’ objectives for 4G were concentrated on improving performance. A few 
of their objectives were: high data rate, large number of simultaneously 
supportable users,, low cost per bit, low latency, good quality of service, good 
coverage and support for mobility at high speeds. Thus, 4G wireless 
technologies are based on 3G but with a few key differences, the most important 
of which is that they operate entirely based on the TCP/IP architecture and suite 
of protocols. For this reason, security issues arise since the technology is moved 
to an open set of communication protocols. To deepen our understanding of 4G 
networks, information about the network and security architecture of LTE and 
WiMAX technologies is provided in the rest of the chapter.  
a. LTE Network Architecture  
The LTE Network architecture [9, 10] is depicted in Figure 7. It 
relies on two basic Network Elements (NEs): the eNodeB (eNB), which is actually 
an improved base station, and the Access Gateway (AGW), which includes all 
the required functions for interfacing with the Evolved Packet Core (EPC). The 
eNB resides in the E-UTRAN (Evolved UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access Network). 
It is the entity by which the User Equipment (UE) is connected to the wireless 
network. The E-UTRAN connects to the EPC, which is IP-based, and the EPC 
subsequently connects to the provider wired IP network.  
LTE incorporates several improvements over 3G. First, LTE only 
uses two basic NE types, the eNB and the AGW, as it does not require a circuit-
switched interface while UMTS uses four basic elements the Mobile Switching 
Center (MSC), the Gateway Mobile Switching Center (GMSC), the Serving 
GPRS Support Node (SGSN) and the Gateway GPRS Support Node (GGSN). 
Second, the architecture is all IP-based, from the packet generated in the UE to 
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the signaling and control protocols used. Third, the architecture used is meshed, 
which improves the network’s performance and offers reliability, efficiency and 
redundancy. 
 
Figure 7.  LTE system architecture evolution, from [9]. 
In order to understand how security is enhanced in the LTE 
network, a few more details about LTE components and how they cooperate is 
needed. Starting with the eNB, which is the single type of system in the E-
UTRAN, it takes care of the radio-interface-related functions. Moreover, it is 
responsible for [9, 10]: 
• inter-cell radio resource management (RRM) that 
coordinates resource allocation between different cell sites 
• radio admission control that validates or disapproves the 
connection’s establishment  after a check is performed 
• scheduling through dynamic resource allocation 
• negotiation of QoS on the uplink 
• compression/decompression of the packets that are 
transferred to or from the user equipment. 
 
 20 
The second basic network entity in LTE, the AGW, includes the 
following modules [9, 10]:  
• MME (Mobile Management Entity): the essential node for 
LTE. It is the node where mobility and security 
authentication, as well as management of user equipment 
identity, are accomplished. After the user equipment 
connects to the network, MME chooses the Serving 
Gateway. Moreover, after receiving the authentication data 
that was generated by HSS, it authenticates the user. Lastly, 
it is responsible for security key management and regulating 
user equipment roaming. 
• HSS (Home Subscriber Server): handles the user 
information and security enforcement. All information needed 
for network entities to complete sessions that have to do with 
the user and the user’s subscription reside in the HSS. The 
HSS generates the authentication data, which is later used 
by MME and is essential for the authentication and key 
agreement procedure between MME and user equipment. 
Instead of using SS7 to connect to the packet core (as was 
used in 3G), it relies on IP-based Diameter protocol, the 
authentication, authorization, and accounting protocol 
developed to succeed RADIUS. More information about 
RADIUS is provided in [11].  
• SGW (Serving Gateway): is responsible for trafficking data 
packets. It terminates the interface towards E-UTRAN 
providing mobility to inter-eNodeB handovers as well as 
between LTE and other 3GPP technologies. Furthermore, it 
replicates the data packets, which is important in the case of 
legitimate interceptions. 
• PGW (Packet Data Network Gateway): provides to the user 
equipment the option of connecting to more than one 
provider wired network since the user equipment (UE) can 
be connected to more than one PGW at the same time. This 
is the gateway through which UE connects to devices that do 
not reside in the service provider main IP network. A 
beneficial functionality of PGW is that it is essential for 
mobility between 3GPP and non 3GPP technologies. It is 
responsible for allocating the user equipment’s IP address, 
as well as offering per user packet filtering, policy 
enforcement, and charging support. 
Finally, the LTE network architecture enables these modules to 
work on the same or different devices due to its flexibility. 
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b. LTE Security Architecture 
Since the follow-on to the initial cellular service (2G digital 
successor to the 1G analog service), wireless security has improved significantly. 
Based on already improved 3GPP security, LTE continues to make 
communications more secure. Measures have been taken to protect the user 
identity, secure signaling between the user equipment and MME, as well as 
secure communication between 3GPP networks and trusted non-3GPP users. 
Thus, compared to 3G, the key hierarchy and interworking security have 
improved. There are added security features for the eNodeB, and the 
authentication and key agreement was extended. 
A schematic diagram of the LTE security overview is depicted in 
Figure 8: 
 
Figure 8.  LTE security overview, from [10]. 
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There are significant similarities between Figures 1 and 8 since 
LTE relies on the 3G architecture. The key difference is that instead of one 
Access Network, in LTE there are two distinct interfaces, one for 3GPP and one 
for non-3GPP access. For non-3GPP users the non-3GPP domain security 
(class V) depicted in the diagram allows the user equipment to access the EPC 
network securely through the non-3GPP network, enforcing at the same time 
radio access link protection [10]. 
The structure of the LTE security is concentrated on key security 
and hierarchy, authentication, encryption and integrity protection, key 
management, and user identity protection [10].  
(1)  Key Security and Hierarchy. A new key hierarchy is 
depicted in Figure 9 that enforces the security protection of signaling and user 
data traffic. In LTE, there are five distinct security-critical keys that are used for 
different purposes and have different life spans. Using the permanent key, K, that 
is stored on USIM, the ciphering, CK, and integrity, IK, keys are generated during 
an EPS (Evolved Packet System) AKA procedure, similar to that done for the 
3G.Thereafter, the KASME (Access Security Management Entity) is generated 
based on CK, IK, and the SN identity. Subsequently, the integrity, KNASint, and 
ciphering, KNASenc, keys, used to provide security in NAS (Non Access Stratum) 
signaling messages between UE and MME, as well as the intermediate key, KeNB, 
are derived from KASME. The KeNB is derived in MME and UE; it is the one on which 
the keys, KUPenc, KRRCint and KRRCenc, are based. The encryption key, KUPenc (Key 
User Plane encryption), is used to protect the user messages exchanged 
between the UE and eNB. The integrity, KRRCint, and encryption, KRRCenc, keys 
provide RRC integrity and encryption protection, respectively, between the UE 
and eNB. A more detailed report about the five keys (KNASint,  KNASenc, KUPenc, KRRCint 
and KRRCenc), their length and purpose, as well as the intermediate keys from 




Figure 9.  Key hierarchy of LTE, from [10]. 
 
 
Table 1.    Summary description of EPS security keys, from [12]. 
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(2) Authentication, Encryption and Integrity Protection. 
Fresh authentication vectors (AVs), good security algorithms, and use of IPSec 
are the anchors upon which the authentication, encryption, and integrity 
protection are based. First of all, the AVs are the vital elements of the 
authentication procedure, and the freshness is effected through the sequence 
numbers that are included in the exchanged messages. Freshness is a term 
used to state that the AVs are new and have not been used again. Freshness 
provides replay attack protection. Second, the security algorithms that are used 
in the HE and USIM to generate the authentication vectors are one-way 
mathematical functions making it difficult for the intruder to derive the input from 
the output. Third, the use of IPSec provides confidentiality to messages that are 
exchanged between nodes in the LTE EPS, as well as messages between nodes 
in home and visited networks [10].   
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(3) Key Management. LTE uses EPS AKA, depicted in 
Figure 10, for the authentication through which the keys are established and 
verified. EPS AKA starts with the UE sending its identity and continues with 
credentials exchange and challenge-response messages. In this way, security is 
provided for key management, which consists of key parameter establishment, 
generation and distribution. 
(4) User Identity Protection. In order to prevent user 
identity disclosure to unauthorized entities, LTE minimizes the instances when 
the user’s permanent identity is sent over the air by using temporary identifiers 
when possible. The various identifiers used, both temporary and permanent, are 
as follows [9], [10]: 
• IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity): A permanent 
identity that is sent in the clear when the associated user 
equipment attempts to initiate access to the network.  
• IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity): A permanent 
identifier that is unique for every mobile device; used by 
companies to deny access when there is a report of a stolen 
mobile device, even if the SIM is replaced. 
• M-TMSI (MME-associated Temporary Mobile Subscriber 
Identity): A temporary identifier that enforces subscriber 
confidentiality between UE and MME; the visited network 
assigns it after encryption. There is no feasible disclosure of 
the relationship between IMSI and M-TMSI to entities other 
than UE and MME.  
• S-TMSI (System Architecture Evolved Temporary Mobile 
Subscriber Identity): A temporary identifier that is used for 
paging the UE; used by the network to request the 
establishment of a NAS signaling connection to the UE. 
• GUTI (Globally Unique Temporary Identity): A temporary 
identifier that identifies uniquely the MME and the UE within 
the MME enforcing subscriber’s confidentiality. It can also be 
used by the network and the UE during exchanging 
messages in order to establish user equipment identity in the 
EPS. 
• C-RNTI (Cell Radio Network Temporary Identifier): A 
temporary identifier that is used to uniquely identify the UE at 
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the cell level and is assigned by the network. This is 
changed when UE moves to another cell.  
There are more ways that LTE networks enforce security by 
using End-to-End Security. These include [9, 10]: 
• Authentication and Key Agreement: a mutual authentication 
between the UE and the EPC takes place that is essential 
for LTE security through an AKA procedure. As depicted in 
Figure 10, authentication starts with the UE when it tries to 
connect to the EPC. The MME, representing the EPC, 
makes an authentication request to the HSS. The HSS that 
has the subscriber information verifies the authentication and 
generates authentication data that are later forwarded to the 
MME and verified by the UE. Moreover, during the AKA 
procedure more security keys are generated that are used 
for encryption and integrity protection. The procedure is 
similar to that for 3GPP access networks. The procedure is 
altered for non-3GPP access networks. First, the 
authentication takes place between the UE and the AAA 
(Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting) server, 
which resides in the EPC. The access authentication is 
based on the Extensible Authentication Protocol – AKA 
(EAP-AKA) procedure. The trusted non-3GPP access 
networks can be pre-configured in the UE, otherwise the 
non-3GPP access network is considered untrusted. In the 
case of an untrusted non-3GPP access network, an IPSec 
tunnel is established between the UE and the gateway 
ePDG (evolved Packet Data Gateway). This tunnel is used 
by the UE to pass the data through to the trusted ePDG that 
is connected to the EPC; it should rely on the Internet Key 
Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) and the EAP-AKA.   
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Figure 10.  EPS AKA, from [10]. 
• Confidentiality and Integrity of Signaling: the RRC signaling 
between the UE and the eNB, as well as NAS signaling 
between the UE and the MME, are included in the Network 
Access Control plane. They are both encrypted providing 
confidentiality. 
• User Plane Confidentiality: user plane data/voice is 
encrypted between the UE and the eNB to provide 
confidentiality. Moreover, in order to transport the user plane 
data, an IPSec tunnel can be established between the eNB 
and the SGW. 
3. WiMAX Security  
WiMAX consists of the wireless technologies that are based on IEEE 
802.16 standards. In order to become familiar with WiMAX, information about 
WiMAX networks is provided so that the reader has an idea about some terms 
that are necessary to understand the security architecture. 
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a. WiMAX Network Architecture  
In the figure below, a typical end-to-end WiMAX network 
architecture is depicted.  
 
 
Figure 11.  Mobile WiMAX network, from [9]. 
WiMax [9] is an all-IP, flat network whose basic elements are the 
Access Service Network (ASN) and the Connectivity Service Network (CSN). 
From the following figure that depicts the Network Reference Model, it is obvious 
that there may be two CSNs, one in the home Network Service Provider (NSP) 
and one in the visited NSP, as well as multiple ASNs. 
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Figure 12.  WiMAX network reference model, from [13]. 
Analyzing the main entities, the mobile stations are the entities 
through which the subscribers attain access to the network.  
The Network Access Provider (NAP) consists of one or more ASNs. 
Every Access Service Network (ASN) forms the access service network 
comprised of the BSs and the ASN gateways that are connected over an IP 
infrastructure; it provides the set of functions that are related to access services. 
The ASN-GW enforces security, since MS user traffic is tunneled as payload 
between the BS and itself. Moreover the ASN-GWs offer message forwarding 
and mobility of MS.  
The CSN may reside either on the home NSP or the visited NSP 
and it represents the network functions necessary for IP connectivity. The visited 
NSP CSN is the one that services the subscriber while the home NSP CSN is 
where the subscriber actually belongs. When the MS is not roaming there is only 
one NSP, the home NSP.  
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The CSN consists of many network elements, as depicted in Figure 
11. First of all, the AAA server includes an AAA database where the mobile 
station profiles are stored. The server is responsible for authenticating the MS 
through messages that arrive from the ASN-GW. After authentication takes 
place, the mobile station’s profile, along with QoS parameters, are sent to the 
ASN-GW. The Home Agent (HA), which provides global mobility and data 
transport to the Internet, processes the control signals from the ASN-GW, 
assigns a mobile IP address to the mobile station and keeps track of the IP 
payload. IP Multimedia System (IMS) servers are entrusted to process Voice 
Over IP (VOIP) calls inside the WiMAX network. Media Gateway Controllers 
(MGW) are used to provide access to the Public Switched Telephone Network 
(PSTN) if the call is terminated outside the WiMax network.  
Lastly, in the case of multiple ASNs in an NAP, mobility is handled 
through the ASN-GWs. When a MS moves from a home NSP to a visited NSP, 
the AAA server takes care of the transfer of credentials and profiles from the 
home NSP to the visited NSP. The calls can be transferred in the same way 
when an MS moves from one BS to another served by the same ASN-GW [9]. 
b. WiMAX Security Architecture 
The WiMAX security architecture [9, 14, 15] is based on 802.16 
standards and addresses some known existing security problems in 3G 
networks. The architecture is based on an AAA framework that provides device, 
user, and mutual authentication between the MS and the NSP; global roaming; 
QoS policy control; and secure mobility management [14]. 
One of the basic security concepts in WiMAX is the introduction of 
a security sub-layer in the MAC layer for the wireless link between the BS and 
the MS. The IEEE 802.16e defines the standards for the security sub-layer and 
the security protocol stack, as depicted in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13.   Security protocol stack for WiMAX 802.16e, from [9]. 
The security sub-layer is responsible for authentication and 
authorization, key management and distribution, and data encryption. 
(1) Authentication. User and device authentication 
between an MS and the home CSN relies on Privacy and Key Management 
version 2 (PKMv2). There are two potential types of authentication [9, 14, 15]: 
• RSA Based Authentication: WiMAX devices presuppose that 
credentials necessary for the authentication procedure 
(X.509 digital certificate) are loaded before the first time they 
are used and that these credentials are also programmed in 
the AAA server that resides in the home CSN. The X.509 
certificate is issued by the MS manufacturer and contains 
the MS’s public key and MAC address. The certificate is sent 
to the servicing BS during an Authentication Key (AK) 
request; it is validated by the BS and then the AK is 
encrypted using the MS’s PK and sent back to the MS. 
• Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) based 
authentication: the MS is authenticated by either a unique 
operator-issued credential (like SIM, USIM, user id and 
password) or the X.509 certificate. There are three EAP 
schemes: EAP-AKA for SIM based authentication, EAP-
Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS) for X.509 based 
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authentication, and EAP-Tunneled Transport Layer Security 
with Microsoft Challenge-Handshake Authentication Protocol 
version 2 (EAP-TTLS MS-CHAP v2) to provide secure 
connections in roaming cases and also user credentials 
protection. 
In Figure 14, the layering of the PKMv2 user authentication 
protocols is depicted. 
 
Figure 14.  PKMv2 user authentication protocols, from [15]. 
PKMv2 transfers the EAP between the MS and the BS in the 
ASN. If the authenticator does not reside in the BS then the EAP is forwarded to 
the authenticator over an authenticator relay protocol. In the authenticator, the 
EAP messages are encapsulated in AAA protocol packets and sent to the AAA 
server in the home CSN through AAA proxies. 
(2) User Authorization. The MS sends an authorization 
request to the BS, which includes an Authorization Key request and a Security 
Association IDentity (SAID) request, by sending the X.509 certificate encryption 
and cryptographic algorithms to the BS. The BS, after successful validation with 
the AAA server, responds by sending the AK, encrypted with MS’s public key, 
along with a lifetime key and an SAID. The authorization by the AAA server 
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happens only the first time the MS associates with the BS. After that, the BS 
authorizes the MS without interacting with the AAA server [15]. 
(3) Key management/distribution and traffic encryption. 
The PKMv2 procedures [15] on which the WiMAX security relies are depicted in 
Figure 15.  
 
Figure 15.  PKMv2 procedure during initial network entry, from [15]. 
In the first step, after successful ranging takes place, the MS 
and the ASN negotiate the session link capabilities by exchanging Subscriber 
Station Basic Capabilities (SBC) messages, including the PKMv2 security 
capabilities, authorization policy and device requirements. After the link is set up, 
the MS sends an initialization message to the Authenticator to begin the EAP 
sequence. 
In the second step, the authenticator sends an EAP 
Identity/Request message to the MS. The MS replies by sending EAP response 
messages, which are forwarded through AAA proxies, to the AAA server. The 
 34 
procedure is finished after receipt of one or more messages from the AAA server 
informing the user whether or not the authentication was successful. 
In the third step, a Master Session Key (MSK) and an 
Enhanced Master Session Key (EMSK) (64 bytes or longer) are established 
between the MS and the AAA server. The MSK is also forwarded to the 
Authenticator by the AAA server and is used to generate the Pairwise Master 
Key (PMK) between the MS and the Authenticator. Further, the MS and the AAA 
server use the EMSK to generate mobile keys.   
In the fourth step, a 160-bit Authorization Key (AK) based on 
the PMK is generated by both the MS and the Authenticator. 
In the fifth step, the Authenticator transfers the AK and its 
context to the BS, which caches the information necessary for future action. 
In the sixth step, a Security Association (SA) three-way 
handshake procedure takes place between the MS and the BS. The SAs are the 
security information that the BS and one or more MSs share to enforce security 
in their communication. The Traffic Encryption Key (TEK) that is used in the 
three-way handshake is a random number that is generated in the BS based on 
the AK. The 128-bit Key Encryption Key (KEK) is used to encrypt the TEK before 
the key transfer from the BS and it is generated based on the AK. The SA may 
belong to one of the following categories: primary, static, or dynamic. The MS 
establishes the primary SA during the initialization phase. The static SAs are 
established within the BS. Dynamic SAs are created and destroyed depending 
on the service flows. MS and BS compute Hashed Message Authentication Code 
(HMAC) values and compare them to those that are sent with the encrypted data 
in order to find integrity failures. The three-way handshake starts by the BS 
sending a Security Association Traffic Encryption Key (SA-TEK) challenge to the 
MS. The SA-TEK challenge includes the AK that is going to be used and the 
unique challenge value. After successful verification of HMAC, the MS sends an 
SA-TEK Request to the BS asking to be authorized to access potential SAs. The 
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three-way handshake finishes with the SA-TEK Response, where the BS 
identifies the primary and static SAs to which the MS is allowed access. 
In the seventh step, the MS requests Traffic Encryption 
Keys, which are generated and encrypted using KEK, from the BS and sent back 
to the MS according to the procedure stated in the previous paragraph. 
In the eighth and ninth step, the TEK registration takes place 
between the BS and the Authenticator, as well as service flows mapped onto an 
SA, completing the PKMv2 procedure [15].   
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III. SECURITY ISSUES IN 3G, LTE AND WIMAX AND 
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS  
In Chapter II, the necessary background regarding the security 
architectures of the three wireless networking technologies of interest was 
presented. This chapter begins by providing a security threats and vulnerabilities 
report. It then presents a few solutions that try to eliminate the weaknesses of 
these technologies.  
A. SECURITY THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES 
As technology improves, scientists try to eliminate known security threats 
and vulnerabilities. However, even if all known security issues are fixed, there 
may still be many issues that may not be well-known that make the technologies 
vulnerable to intruders. One factor is that every new technology is based on the 
previous one and interworking between the two technologies must be provided. 
This restriction makes it more difficult to address the security issues. In this 
section the security weaknesses, as well as the potential attacks, of the three 
wireless technologies of our interest are discussed.  
1. UMTS Security Issues 
The 3G security architecture was built on the concepts of GSM, but it 
addressed many weaknesses of GSM. Despite the security efforts that have 
been made to protect the 3G networks, there are some cases where the 
adversary can find opportunities to attack the networks. 
a. Subscriber Identity Catching 
The Network Access Domain is the most vulnerable part of 3G 
networks since it is responsible for protecting the wireless link. The wireless link 
is the most difficult to protect and most easy to intercept. One of the most 
common vulnerabilities of Access Security is catching the subscriber identity. In 
order to understand this kind of vulnerability, the cases where the IMSI is 
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provided are restated. Whenever the subscriber turns on his/her UE and 
whenever the correspondence between TMSI and IMSI (which is tracked in the 
VLR) is lost, the UE has to send the IMSI in the clear over the radio link. Thus, in 
the initial connection request message and when the VLR database loses 
synchronization with respect to the UE, the IMSI is sent unencrypted. A very 
simple mechanism that can be used by an attacker is depicted in Figure 16 [14]. 
The attacker impersonates a fake base station. During the start of the connection 
process, the victim uses the TMSI. After the user fails to be recognized, the fake 
VLR asks the user to identify himself/herself and the victim sends the actual IMSI 
in the clear. Then the attacker disconnects, having acquired the subscriber’s 
IMSI [16], [17]. 
 
Figure 16.  Obtaining IMSI, from [16]. 
b. Secret Key and Confidentiality Key and Integrity Key 
Exposure 
The secret key, K, as well as the confidentiality and integrity keys, 
CK and IK, respectively, are vulnerable and can be disclosed to an adversary 
through cryptographic attacks. An adversary can use some data that is 
transmitted on the radio access link and gain access to derive the K, CK, and IK, 
as depicted in Figure 17. If the attacker wants to obtain the CK and IK he will use  
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the protected information that is transferred between the user and the network 
and apply a cipher-text-only attack to the encryption function, f8, and integrity 
function, f9 [18]. 
 
Figure 17.  Attacks on the radio link, from [18]. 
When the attacker wants to derive the secret key, K, he uses the 
messages that are exchanged during the AKA procedure and applies 
cryptographic attacks to the security functions, f1 and f2. In Figure 18, the data 
that are exposed are the RAND, AMF, MAC, and XRES, as well as the security 
functions, f1 and f2. Thus, the adversary can mount a cipher-text-only attack 
against f1 and known plaintext attack against f2 [18]. 
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Figure 18.  Exposure of security functions to cryptographic attacks, from [18]. 
c. User Specific DoS by Modifying Initial Security 
Capabilities of ME or Authentication Parameters 
This denial-of-service (DoS) attack presupposes that the IMSI is 
revealed to the attacker using Subscriber Identity Catching discussed earlier. 
Thereafter, when the specific user associated with that IMSI makes a connection 
request the adversary modifies the security capabilities of the ME. That 
modification, which is not integrity protected, remains undetected until the 
exchange of security capabilities takes place and the connection procedure 
terminates. This procedure may consume bandwidth and resources making 
effective a user DoS attack. Using the same technique, the attacker can modify 
the un-encrypted, non-integrity protected authentication parameters, AUTH, 
RAND or RES, preventing the authentication of the network and the user. Thus, 
another DoS attack is created [17]. 
d. DoS Using Connection Reject Message 
This DoS attack also presupposes that the IMSI is revealed to the 
attacker using Subscriber Identity Catching. When the user tries to connect to the 
network he makes use of one of his unique identifiers, TMSI, P-TMSI, or IMEI. 
The attacker then rejects the connection request. The UE compares the initial UE 
identity with the one received in the reject message in order to confirm the 
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legitimacy of the message. If the identities are the same, the connection 
procedure is terminated. Otherwise he ignores the message. Thus, a DoS attack 
against the user becomes feasible [17]. 
e. DoS by Flooding the HLR/AuC 
As described in the previous section, the attacker utilizes 
Subscriber Identity Catching and builds an IMSI database. Then he uses an 
automatic procedure to generate a connection request per IMSI. The rogue VLR 
sends all the IMSIs included in its database except the one that is already 
connected to the HLR/AuC. The HLR validates the IMSIs and computes the five 
Authorization Vectors (AVs) per IMSI. This is a time-consuming process, 
especially if the number of the IMSIs is large. The AVs are forwarded to the VLR 
which selects one AV per IMSI and sends the RAND and AUTN for 
authentication. The attacker, of course, will not be authenticated since he does 
not have the key needed to compute the RES, but he has already exhausted the 
computing resources and bandwidth of HLR/AuC by flooding a significant 
number of connection requests. Thus, a DoS to new users becomes feasible 
[17]. 
f. Redirection Attack 
For the redirection attack [19, 20], it is assumed that an adversary 
is operating a device that has base station capabilities as well as mobile station 
emulating capabilities. Thus, the attacker can impersonate both a base station 
and a mobile station at the same time. Therefore, a mobile station can connect to 
the false base station and the false base station can connect to a legitimate base 
station. When a user is in the area of his home network and tries to connect to a 
genuine base station, the attacker intercepts the connection and enables a 
connection with the false base station. Thereafter, it sends a connection request 
to a legitimate serving network on behalf of a victim’s mobile station and transfers 
securely the messages between the victim and the serving network (SN). This 
happens since the authentication between the victim and the serving network is 
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feasible, and the communication is protected through established keys.  The 
redirection attack [20] is depicted in Figure 19.  
 
Figure 19.  Redirection attack in UMTS AKA, from [20]. 
The redirection attack causes billing issues to the user since he 
actually uses the services of the home network but pays for roaming through the 
foreign network. Neither the home network nor the victim can identify the 
redirection attack. Moreover, the intruder can forward the traffic through a 
network that has no or weak encryption, enabling the adversary to eavesdrop on 
traffic [19]. 
g.  Man-in-the-Middle Attack  
In the 3GPP-AKA, the SN is not authenticated during the 
authentication process. Thus, the MS or the HN cannot determine the legitimacy 
of the SN. An attacker, who can mount a Man-in-the-Middle attack between the 
MS and the SN over the wireless network, can exploit that limitation. In this way, 
the attacker is interjected between the legitimate entities and can have access to 
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the authentication messages as well as the traffic messages, which are then 
subject to alteration. Thus, DoS attacks are possible. A few attack models over 
the wireless network were developed and analyzed in depth in [21].  
In one of the models of wireless network attack, the attacker 
impersonates the SN and sends a reject message to the MS during the 
authentication procedure, enabling a DoS attack since the MS believes that the 
SN is legitimate. In another model of wireless network attack, the attacker 
modifies the RAND that it receives from the SN and forwards a false F-RAND to 
the MS. When the MS realizes that the SN is fraud, it terminates the 
authentication procedure and the DoS attack succeeds. In a third model, the 
attacker modifies the RES that is received from the MS and sends a false F-RES 
to the SN. The SN identifies that the MS is fraudulent, terminates the 
authentication process, and the DoS succeeds. The models are depicted in the 
following figures:  
  
Figure 20.  First attack model using authentication rejected message (ARM) in 
wireless network, from [21]. 
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h. Man-in-the-Middle Attack and Base Station 
Impersonation of Combined UMTS/GSM User Equipment  
In this case, the attacker takes benefit of the fact that GSM does 
not offer integrity protection. Thus, during UMTS - GSM interworking the attacker 
can force the subscriber to use no encryption. The attack assumes that the 
adversary already knows the victim’s IMSI and security capabilities using one of 
the methods described earlier in this chapter. 
At first the attacker impersonates the victim MS and sends to the 
visited network the security capabilities as well as the TMSI during connection 
set-up. If the TMSI is not recognized the MS responds to the identity request by 
sending the victim’s IMSI. Following this, an authentication request between the 
visited and the home network takes place and, after successful authentication, 
the RAND and AUTN are forwarded to the adversary, who finally disconnects. 
This procedure is depicted in the Figure 23: 
 
 
Figure 23.  Attacker obtains currently valid AUTN, from [25]. 
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Subsequently, the adversary impersonates a valid GSM base 
station. The attacker lures the target MS by sending its beacons with higher 
transmitting power causing a hand-off and establishes a connection with the MS.  
 
Figure 24.  Attacker impersonates valid GSM base station, from [25]. 
During the connection establishment, the victim MS sends its 
security capabilities and its identifier, either the TMSI or the IMSI, to the attacker. 
The impersonated BS sends the RAND and AUTN derived from the real network 
and the victim computes the RES and replies, stating that the authentication 
token is verified. Thereafter, the false base station dictates the use of no or weak 
encryption to the MS. The MS accepts it, considering it is connected to a GSM 
base station. This procedure is depicted in Figure 24. Thus, the intruder 
succeeds in fooling the MS into not using encryption and can thereafter 
eavesdrop on all communication from that MS [25]. 
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2. LTE Security Issues 
The LTE security architecture and 4G technologies, in general, have 
significant differences as compared to the previous technologies; the most 
important of which is that they operate entirely based on TCP/IP architecture and 
protocols. Even if efforts were made during design to reduce the security issues 
caused by the open nature and IP-based infrastructure, there are still a few 
security issues with which to be concerned. 
a. IP-based Vulnerabilities 
LTE, since it is a flat, all-IP-based architecture, is vulnerable to well-
known attacks associated with Internet. Thus, there is a danger of IP address 
spoofing, phishing attacks, DoS attacks, viruses, worms, spam mails and calls 
[10]. 
b. Base Station Attack 
The fact that the Mobile Management Entity (MME) in LTE handles 
many eNBs and HeNBs (in LTE-A), along with the flat IP-based architecture, 
makes it easier for an adversary to attack a base station than in UMTS. In the 
UMTS the serving network only handles a couple of Radio Network Controls 
(RNC) in a hierarchical way, while in LTE a direct path is offered to attackers due 
to its being an all-IP network. Moreover, if a base station is compromised, the 
whole network will be in danger because of the nature of IP-based architecture 
as it is explained in [22, 23, 24]. Furthermore, with the introduction of HeNB in 
LTE Advanced networks, a few more threats arise. The HeNB is a small, low-
power cellular base station that has the eNB’s functionality. It is typically intended 
for use in residences or small businesses, offering increased indoor coverage for 
voice and high-speed data service. However, HeNB may use an insecure link to 
connect to the SGW, offering an attacker vector to adversaries. For example, 
once an HeNB is compromised, the attacker can create a fraudulent version with 
dual functionality that can impersonate a base station and a user at the same 
time [10].  
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c. HeNB Weakness  
Beyond the weaknesses of HeNB associated with IP-based 
attacks, it is vulnerable to a few other threats. Since there is no mutual 
authentication between the UE and the HeNB, there is a risk of eavesdropping, 
masquerading and Man-in-the-Middle attacks. Moreover, since it is exposed to 
the public Internet, DoS attacks become easier to make against a HeNB. Lastly, 
HeNB may be open to physical intrusions because of its placement in unsecure 
areas [10]. 
d. Handover Authentication Vulnerabilities 
A few concerns arise regarding the handover authentication 
procedure due to the multiplicity of mobility scenarios between eNBs and 
HeNBS. Even if the 3GPP committee defined a few mobility and authentication 
scenarios [10] problems still may arise in the case that the base stations are 
handled by different MMEs. Furthermore, more network security threats arise 
due to the heterogeneous networks interoperating with LTE. This is a problem 
especially during the process of transferring an ongoing call or data session from 
one connected cell of the core network to another, called handover or handoff. 
Even if the 3GPP committee has made suggestions for a secure handover 
between the E-UTRAN and non-3GPP access networks during roaming [10], the 
UE has to go through the whole access authentication procedure with the new 
network before it completes the handovers. Thus, many messages have to be 
exchanged with the AAA server, causing more handover delay. Furthermore, the 
key derivation procedures that were analyzed in [10] concluded that multiple key 
management mechanisms are required, which increases the overall complexity. 
While the potential delays may impact user satisfaction, the added complexity of 
key management and multiplicity authentication actions expose issues that 
exploited by adversaries to consume network resources of the core network or 
other access networks [10]. 
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e. MME Buffer Exhaust - HSS Computational Power 
Exhaust 
During the authentication procedure, as depicted in the Figure 10 in 
Chapter II, the MME at first has to forward the messages from the UE to the HSS 
even before the UE is authenticated by the MME. Then after receiving the 
authentication data response from HSS, the MME sends the user authentication 
request to the UE. After receiving the user authentication response, the MME can 
authenticate the UE. The attacker might exploit this process by impersonating a 
legitimate user and sending fake IMSIs to cause DoS attacks to the HSS and the 
MME, causing the HSS to compute too many authentication vectors and the 
MME to exhaust memory buffer allocations waiting for long periods of time for the 
UE to send the user authentication response [10]. 
f. IMSI Catching 
In the EPS-AKA protocol, the authentication starts with the user 
identification in which the UE sends the IMSI in plain text. Moreover, if there are 
synchronization failures when the UE roams to a new MME or the current MME 
cannot be contacted, a user identity request message is sent from the MME to 
the UE, to which the user has to send his IMSI, also in the clear, if no other 
temporary identifier is valid. The adversaries can then collect the users’ IMSIs 
and use them to mount potential attacks, such as DoS [26].  
g. User Equipment Tracking 
There are a few vulnerabilities that lead to user tracking. These 
vulnerabilities are categorized as follows: 
(1) Tracking User Temporary ID. The attacker may track 
the user’s temporary ID and then link the temporary ID to the user. The 
adversary may link to the user when the user tries to connect to a compromised 
server and inserts his user name. Another way is to wait for the user to transmit 
his permanent or temporary ID when transmitted in plaintext [26]. 
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(2) Exploiting the Linkability of IMSI/TMSI and RNTI. The 
adversary can track all the traffic that is associated with the temporary identifiers 
since temporary identifiers are transmitted over the air interface. Moreover, the 
attacker can impersonate an eNB and request the user’s IMSI. After having 
derived the IMSI, the adversary can backtrack along the user’s entire trace [26]. 
(3) Serving Network Authentication. The attacker can 
impersonate a serving network and simply forward the messages it receives from 
associating UEs. Thus, it can work as a fake serving network and after 
confidentiality protection is enabled it can intercept and decrypt encrypted data 
[26]. 
h. Wired Link Weakness 
The wired link through which messages are transferred between 
the network entities is unprotected. All the messages are transferred 
unencrypted. Thus, there is a potential risk of an attacker intercepting and 
deriving the Authentication Vectors that are transferred from the HSS to the MME 
[27]. 
i. Symmetric Key Weakness 
The authentication between HSS and UE is based on symmetric 
key encryption. Since the session cipher key can be disclosed to an attacker 
through the network, the resultant communication’s security becomes 
questionable [27].  
j. Service Network Identity (SNID) catching 
The Service Network Identity is transmitted in plaintext over the air 
interface as well as on the wired link. Thus, it becomes possible for an attacker to 
derive the SNID and mount a false base station or non-legitimate network attack 
[27]. 
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3. WiMAX Security 
There are a few issues that lead to WiMAX insecurity. For example, the 
first steps of the procedure through which the MS initially accesses the BS are 
not secure. Some of the issues and potential attacks that arise in WiMAX security 
are provided below: 
a. Unencrypted Management MAC Messages 
Since management MAC messages are never encrypted, and 
sometimes not authenticated, there is a potential for an adversary eavesdropping 
the messages exchanged, deriving useful information, and mounting Man-in-the-
Middle and DoS attacks. A few examples are provided in [9] and [28], as well as 
their impact.  
In general, during initial network entry an MS exchanges 
information such as security settings, power and configuration settings, mobility 
parameters, and MS capabilities with the BS. Thus, an adversary can derive the 
information by just listening to the traffic. Since these messages are 
unauthenticated, unencrypted, and stateless, a Man-in-the-Middle attack 
becomes feasible and enables the attacker to derive this useful information. 
Moreover, almost all management messages are sent unencrypted, except the 
key transfer messages. Therefore, the attacker can eavesdrop on those 
messages, create an MS profile including the obtained information, monitor the 
MAC address, and associate the derived information to the user equipment [9], 
[28], [29], [30]. 
b. Unauthenticated Management Messages 
Some management messages in IEEE 802.16e are integrity 
protected using either Hash Based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) or 
Cipher Based Message Authentication Code (CMAC). However, there are a few 
messages that are not authenticated at all, causing security vulnerability. In 
particular, the broadcast messages are difficult to protect since there is no 
 52 
common key. Even if there was, it would be useless since the mobile stations 
sharing the key can easily counterfeit the messages. Thus, the communication 
between the BS and the MS can be intercepted [9], [28], [29], [30]. An extensive 
analysis regarding the unauthenticated management messages, specifically, is 
provided in [28], [30]. 
c. Interleaving Attack 
In this case, the attacker impersonates an MS, sends an 
Authorization Information message and then an Authorization Request message 
that contains information which has been derived from previously intercepted 
sessions of the targeted MS. To these messages the attacker receives an 
Authorization Reply message, which is supposed to be verified by the MS by 
sending back an Acknowledgement response. However, the adversary, not 
having the MS’s private key to decrypt the Authorization Reply message, cannot 
create the Acknowledge message. Instead, the adversary starts pretending to be 
the BS and communicates with the legitimate, targeted MS. By using the 
previously derived Authorization Reply message it solicits and receives the 
Authorization Acknowledgement message from the legitimate MS. Then the 
adversary uses the Authorization Acknowledgement message to complete the 
pending uncompleted session with the BS. In this way, the attacker authenticates 
himself with the BS and mounts a Man-in-the-Middle attack. Even if attacker has 
no access to the AK or TEK and so does not have the ability to decrypt or create 
encrypted messages, he can still act to forge or drop unprotected messages [28]. 
d. Authorization Vulnerabilities/Replay Attacks 
The authentication/authorization protocol is vulnerable to replay 
attacks. If the Authentication Reply message is lost the Subscriber Station SS 
resends an Authentication Request message. The BS cannot determine if the SS 
did not receive the Reply message or if it is only a replay attack; thus it responds. 
An attacker can exploit this and flood the BS with Authentication Request 
messages limiting the BS‘s computing power. Moreover, the authorization 
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message does not include any digest so it cannot provide a means of integrity 
check and ensure the message was not modified [9].  
e. Shared Keys in Multicast and Broadcast Service 
The Multicast and Broadcast Service (MBS) offers the opportunity 
of distributing data to multiple MSs simultaneously by using one single message. 
The broadcast messages are encrypted symmetrically with a key shared among 
the group members, called the Group KEK (GKEK). This key is generated and 
sent from the BS to the group of MSs after the MSs successfully authenticate. 
Each MS can decrypt and encrypt messages using the GTEK. A rogue MS might 
pretend to be the legitimate BS. Moreover, since the GKEK is available to every 
group member, an adversary can use it to update the GTEK and distribute its 
own GTEK to the whole group through the Multi and Broadcast Rekeying 
Algorithm (MBRA), which is responsible for GTEK distribution. With this an 
adversary can fool the rest of the group members, which accept the new key and 
are no longer able to encrypt the traffic coming from the legitimate BS. Another 
issue that is related to the GTEK is that the member, after receiving the GTEK, 
can decrypt any traffic sent in the past from the moment when the GTEK first 
became active, assuming of course the rogue adversary had eavesdropped the 
traffic, as well as any additional traffic sent until GTEK lifetime expires [28], [29], 
[30]. 
B. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
The system designers tried to eliminate the security weaknesses inherent 
in the three wireless technologies. There are many solutions that try to 
countermeasure one or more of the security threats. In the remainder of this 
chapter some of these solutions are discussed. These solutions try to mitigate 
the threats described in the first part of the chapter. Some of them are improved 
protocols of already existing solutions. 
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1. UMTS Security Enhancement 
After 3GPP came out with the proposed security scheme for 3G, which 
was actually offering a relatively sufficient security, the academics tried to identify 
its threats and find ways to make it more secure. A few solutions addressing 
security threats and attacks on 3G are provided. 
a. New Defense Strategy Model 
Trying to defeat the Man-in-the-Middle attacks in the wireless 
networks, scientists created a few attack models and proposed a new security 
model of AKA in [21]. 
The security is based on the exchanged messages’ encryption with 
public and private keys for the SN. The authentication between the MS and HN is 
based on a shared secret key, Khm, with which the authentication messages 
between the HN and the MS are encrypted. First, the MS generates a random 
number, R1, and determines the identity of VLR, IDv. Next, it sends a message 
that includes its IMSI, R1, and IDv to the SN, which in turn forwards the message 
to the HN. The HN, after receiving and decrypting the message with the key Khm, 
identifies the MS, generates a random number, R2, the confidentiality and 
integrity keys, CK and IK, respectively, and the expected response, XRES, and 
sends them encrypted with the SN’s public key to the SN. The HN sends the R1, 
R2, XRES and public key of the SN (KUV) to the MS in a message encrypted by 
Khm. Then, the SN decrypts with its private key the message received from the 
HN, derives the CK, IK, XRES and R2, encrypts the R2 with its private key and 
send it to the MS. The MS, after decrypting the messages received from the HN, 
derives the R1 with which it identifies the HN; if the derived value of R1 is 
incorrect, the MS stops the authentication. Otherwise, after obtaining the public 
key of the SN, it decrypts the message from the SN, which includes the nonce R2 
by which it identifies the SN. After decrypting the message received from the SN 
with KUV, it compares the values of R2 received from the HN and the SN to verify 
the SN identity. If they are different, the MS terminates the authentication. 
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Otherwise, it computes CK, IK, and RES and sends the RES to the SN where a 
comparison of RES and XRES takes place. If they are identical, authentication is 
completed, otherwise it fails [21]. The proposed model is depicted in Figure 25. 
 
Figure 25.  The proposed defensing model in 3GPP-AKA, from [21]. 
This model provides mechanisms for authenticating the SN and the 
HN in the wireless and the wired network through encrypting the messages and 
preventing Man-in-the-Middle attacks that were feasible on the Access Domain 
[21]. 
b. Enhanced EMSUCU Protocol 
The solution, described in [18], was based on the Enhancement 
Mobile Security and User Confidentiality for UMTS (EMSUCU) solution that is 
described in detail in [31]. The proposed solution reflects the same philosophy as 
the one in [28] and it assures adequate protection for the secret key, K. The 




Figure 26.  Enhanced EMSUCU, from [18]. 
The Enhanced EMSUCU proposes a solution that prevents IMSI 
disclosure over the air interface. The secret key, K, and the USIM card are used 
to encrypt the IMSI. The protocol assumes that there is a shared secret key, Kmh, 
for the home network that is known by the HLR/AuC and every USIM registered 
with it. A function, f0, is used to generate a random value, RAND, and an integrity 
one-way hash function, f9, to produce a cipher key, Kc, based on the RAND and 
Kmh. Another function, f11, is implemented on the USIM and generates a secret 
Temporary Key, TK, based on K, Kc and RAND every time EMSUCU is executed. 
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The TK is later sent encrypted to the HLR/AuC and used for AV generation. The 
one-way hash function, f10, along with Kc, is used to encrypt the mobile host’s 
IMSI and TK. The key, Kmh, and the functions, f9 and f10, are shared between the 
MS and the HN and are stored in the SIM card for the mobile user and in the HN 
for that user. The procedure starts by generating the RAND, Kc and TK, 
encrypting the IMSI and the TK and then sending an authentication request to 
VLR with these values and the identity of home network, IDHN, so that the VLR 
knows to which HLR to forward the message. On the HLR side, after receiving 
these values, the HLR generates the Kc using the RAND, Kmh and f9 function. 
The Kc is then used to decrypt the IMSI and the TK. Then the AKA procedure 
takes place using the established TK. Thus, the security of the secret key, K, is 
increased since the adversary has to use a cryptographic attack and derive the 
key from the equation, which is not practically feasible. 
f10Kc (TK) = f10Kc (f11 (K, Kc, RAND)) = f10Kc (f11 (K, f9 (Kmh, RAND), RAND)) 
Moreover, the Enhanced EMSUCU suggests that before the 
lifetimes of CK and IK expire a new AKA should be initiated. In this way, before 
the keys, CK and IK, are deleted, they will be used to protect the messages 
during the next AKA procedure. This process is simple to implement by just 
changing the order of the events in the UMTS protocol.  
Lastly, the Enhanced EMSUCU suggests increasing the key size of 
K from 128 bits to a minimum length of 256 bits, which conforms to the NIST 
recommendations, increasing the key security [18]. 
c. S-AKA Protocol 
The S-AKA protocol offers security against redirection and Man-in-
the-Middle attacks and is described in detail in [20]. It is based on the UMTS AKA 
and assumes that the SGSN can handle user authentication securely, the link 
between the SGSN and the HLR/AuC is secure, and that each MS shares a 
secret key and cryptographic functions with its HLR/AuC.  It consists of two 
phases [20]: 
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• In the first phase, called S-AKA-I, the SGSN tries to obtain 
an AV from the HLR so that it can authenticate the MS 
without interacting with the HLR during the second phase. In 
the first message, a new counter, called ACCm, which 
increases every successful authentication, is used to enforce 
freshness and derive the key, DK, from the SK. Further, the 
Location Area Identity (LAI), which is used to identify the 
BSS, the ACCm and the derived DK are used for generating 
the MACm, the keyed authentication code enforcing 
message integrity protection. Thus, when the HLR receives 
the forwarded message from the SGSN it can verify that the 
LAI is the one recognized by the MS; otherwise, the HLR will 
reject the message. In the HLR, the ACCm is compared with 
the HLR’s counter, ACCh, and if the ACCm is smaller than 
the ACCh it rejects the message, having identified the replay 
attack. If this test is passed, the HLR computes the DK and 
AUTN and sends it to the SGSN giving it the opportunity to 
authenticate the MS during future authentication procedures. 
The SGSN then computes the counter, ACCs, and the 
AUTNs and sends the last one to the MS, which verifies the 
SGSN, updates the ACCm, and derives the CK, IK and 
XRES. If there is a GSM BSS involved, an extra key, PLK, is 
generated using a new function, f7, in both the MS and 
SGSN to provide confidentiality of the GSM BSS traffic and 
prevent Man-in-the-Middle attacks. Then the XRES is 
verified by the SGSN, a mutual authentication is enforced 
and the SGSN derives the keys CK, IK, and PLK, to enforce 
security between the MS and the SGSN. The first phase is 
depicted in Figure 26. 
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Figure 27.  S-AKA-I. The SGSN obtains authentication vectors from HLR/AuC, 
from [20]. 
 
• In the second phase, called S-AKA-II, the procedure is 
similar, but there is no involvement of the HLR since the 
SGSN is authorized to authenticate the MS through AVs 
acquired from the first phase. The second phase is depicted 
in the Figure 28. 
The procedures presented in this section, the functions that are 
used, and the procedures through which the counters ACCm, ACCs and ACCh 
are checked and updated are analyzed in detail in [20]. Lastly, the synchronized 
ACCm and ACCs can be beneficial for detecting potential DoS attacks initiated in 




Figure 28.  S-AKA-II. The SGSN mutually authenticates the MS, from [20].  
2. LTE Security Enhancement 
The LTE security architecture is IP-based. The various threats that 
became evident with the architecture forced the scientists to try to find new 
protocols to improve the state provided by the initial protocols. A few solutions 
are provided here. 
a. Security Enhanced EPS-AKA 
The Security Enhanced Evolved Packet System - Authentication 
and Key Agreement (SE EPS- AKA) [27] is an improvement of EPS-AKA, and it 
is based on the Wireless Public Key Infrastructure (WPKI). Before the 
communication between the UE, the MME, and the HSS starts, the digital 
certificate via CA is acquired through the procedure described in [32] and the 
public key are gained. The procedure of SE-EPS AKA is depicted in Figure 29. 
First, the UE makes an access request and sends its IMSI, 
encrypted with the public key of the HSS, PKH, stored in UE smart card, along 
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with the identity of the HSS, IDHSS, to the MME. Then the MME uses the PKH to 
encrypt its network identity, SNID, and sends it along with the message received 
from the UE to the HSS as an authentication request. The HSS decrypts the 
received message with its private key, SKH, derives the IMSI and SNID, and 
checks if they are valid according to its database. If they are, the HSS generates 
an array of random numbers, RAND (1, 2,…,n), and a group of Authentication 
Vectors, AV(1,2,…,n), using the authentication algorithm depicted in Figure 30. 
Thus, using the authentication algorithm, the KASME and XRES are calculated 
and, thereafter, the AV via the equation [27] 
AV = RAND||SNID||KASME||XRES 
The HSS sends the AV along with the IMSI encrypted with MME’S 
public key back to the MME. 
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Figure 30.  The SE-EPS AKA authentication vector generation algorithm, from 
[27]. 
The MME decrypts the message, derives the AV array and IMSI 
and stores the AV array in its database. Thereafter, it selects a non-previously 
used AV (i) and extracts the corresponding RAND (i) and the SNID. The MME 
allocates the cipher Key Set Identifier, KSIASME (i), to KASME (i) of the AV (i) and by 
using a shared algorithm between the MME and the UE, as well as the IMSI, 
generates the S-TMSI (SAE-TMSI). After one-time authentication and cipher key 
negotiation takes place between UE and MME, they both store the relationship 
between the KSIASME (i) and KASME (i) that can be used for future verification 
without the UE and the SN having to follow the initiating authentication process. 
The MME encrypts RAND (i), S-TMSI, KSIASME (i), and SNID with the public key 
of the UE and sends it as a user authentication request to the UE. After 
decrypting the received message with its private key, the UE derives the values 
from the received message, computes the S-TMSI, and authenticates the HSS 
by comparing the calculated and received S-TMSI. If the HSS-provided values 
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are verified, the UE computes the RES (i) and sends it to the MME as an 
authentication response. Otherwise, the process terminates. The MME verifies 
the UE by comparing the RES and XRES and, if valid, both the MME and the UE 
compute the KASME (i), consider it as an intermediate key cipher key, and 
compute the CK and the IK to provide confidentiality and integrity, respectively. If 
RES and XRES are not equal, the process is terminated. Finally the MME and 
the UE store the relationships between the S-TMSI and the arrays (IMSI, AV 
(1,2,…,n), CK(i), IK(i),KSIASME (i), KASME (i)) and (IMSI, SNID, CK(i), IK(i),KSIASME 
(i), KASME (i)). There is one more optional step in which the UE uses its private 
key to sign the IMSI, SNID, and billing information and sends it encrypted, with 
HSS public key, PKH, to the HSS through the MME for future accounting 
information. 
Thus, the security of the user’s identity and the exchanged 
information is enhanced by the use of SE EPS-AKA [27]. 
b. EC-AKA II Protocol 
The EC-AKA2 protocol [26] is an improvement of EC-AKA, and it is 
a new solution that came out in 2013. It offers a solution that mostly addresses 
IMSI catching and user tracking vulnerabilities. It provides confidentiality and 
integrity protection, and it uses symmetrical encryption, which is faster than 
asymmetrical encryption, thereby reducing the delay imposed by security 
mechanisms. The EC-AKA II procedure is depicted in Figure 31.  
The procedure starts with the UE generating three random keys: 
RandomEncKey, RandomIntKey and RandomUESecCapab1. It concatenates 
these with the IMSI and UESecCapabilities. The result is encrypted with the key, 
TIK. This key is the result of the concatenation of PIK and RandomIntKey, where 
PIK can be generated by a hashing function from the IMSI and is the permanent, 
pre-shared, integrity key (PIK) between the HSS and the UE. The message 
containing these values and the SNID are encrypted with the public key of HSS, 
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PKH, and the resulting message, called the NAS attach request, is sent along 
with the HSS identity, IDHSS, to the MME.  
The MME compares the received IDHSS to check if it is in the list of 
the HSSs that implement EC-AKA. If not, it treats the request as an AKA to 
ensure backward compatibility. If it does find the HSS identifier in its list but the 
message is sent unencrypted, the process is terminated since the security 
requirements are violated. If the identifier is valid and the message is encrypted, 
the MME detaches the IDHSS, adds the SNID encrypted by the PKH and sends it 
along with the received encrypted message to the HSS. 
The HSS, after receiving the message from the MME, decrypts 
both the two encrypted messages and compares the SNIDs to verify that they 
are the same. The private key, which is extracted from IMSI, along with a random 
number, RAND, are used to generate the authentication vectors that are going to 
be used not only for the current process but also for future authentication 
processes. The TIK is generated in the same way as on the UE. The original 
encrypted message from the UE is checked for integrity and if it passes the test 
an encryption key, EK, is generated by applying the XOR logic function to the 
PEK and the RandomEncKey. The RandomEncKey was derived from the 
decryption of the message received by the HSS from the MME. If the integrity 
check fails, HSS rejects the request and sends back an error message. If it 
passes the integrity check, the procedure continues by the HSS applying an 
integrity check to the all the previously mentioned with the key, IK, concatenating 
the result with the result of integrity check and encrypting it with serving 
network’s public key, PKM. The encrypted result is sent back to the MME. 
The MME, after receiving the authentication response from HSS, 
decrypts it and authenticates the network; otherwise, it terminates the procedure. 
The MME derives the AV (1) and it integrity checks the RAND (1), AUTN, and 
KSIASME. The integrity check result is concatenated with RAND (1), AUTN and 
KSIASME. Then an algorithm from the ones specified in UESecCap with the key, 
EK, is chosen in order for the result noted earlier to be encrypted. Then a random 
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key, RandomUESecCapab1, is added to the chosen algorithm and it is XORed 
with the encrypted result of the concatenation. The result is sent as a user 
authentication response to the UE. 
 
Figure 31.  EC-AKA II procedure, from [26]. 
The UE, after receiving the message, extracts the encryption 
algorithm, decrypts the data, and by checking the RAND (1), AUTN and KSIASME, 
verifies the network’s authenticity. If the verification fails, it terminates the 
process. Otherwise, it computes the RES and sends it, encrypted by the 
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temporary encryption key, EK, to the MME. The MME then compares the RES 
with the XRES and, if they are the same, authenticates the UE. Then the keys 
that are generated through the AKA are used to protect the communication 
integrity. The MME, using the same algorithm and temporary key EK, encrypts 
the message needed to establish the secure communications along with the 
integrity checking result and sends it to the UE using the NAS Secure Mode 
Command. The encryption and integrity algorithms are selected from the list of 
UE security capabilities that were sent from the UE. The UE verifies the receipt of 
the message by replying with a NAS Secure Mode Command complete 
message. 
Finally, the MME connects to the eNB to which the UE is attached 
and sends all the necessary information, like keys and algorithms, needed to 
establish integrity and confidentiality protected AS communication. The message 
achieving this is called the Initial Context Setup message, and it does not need 
any protection since the communication between the MME and the eNB is 
sufficient using IPSec. Lastly, the eNB orders the UE to start using AS Security 
Mode command and the UE responds informing the eNB about the start of 
integrity and confidentiality protection enforcement. 
The procedure is completed and all the messages from that point 
are protected, eliminating in this way many of the LTE weaknesses [26]. 
3. WiMAX Security Enhancement 
In order to protect against the vulnerabilities of WiMAX security a few 
methods are introduced. 
a. Management Messages Authentication Solution   
By utilizing HMAC or CMAC digests, the non-authenticated 
messages that are identified in the WiMAX vulnerabilities analysis can be 
authenticated. Of course, there is a debate between security and performance 
since the authentication may need up to 168 bits. The more optimal solution is to 
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secure only those unauthenticated management messages causing serious 
defects if forged; the other messages can remain unauthenticated. In order to 
keep as minimum as possible the size of the messages, the Short HMAC or 
CMAC can be used. The Short HMAC provides a digest of 104 bits. The 
alternative solution, CMAC, is based on AES128, resulting in a 128-bit value. 
However, it can be truncated to 64 bits and finally ends up being 104 bits when 
all additional information is added [30]. 
Broadcast messages, however, use symmetric encryption and 
share the key among all member groups. This generates a potential for forged 
messages from any member of the group. However, using symmetric encryption 
outside the group may increase the security and the speed of processing, 
mitigating the risk but not offering complete protection [30]. 
Another solution is the utilization of asymmetric security. The 
private key of the BS is used to sign the management messages. The mobile 
stations verify the received messages by use of the associated public key. 
However, asymmetric encryption is much slower and requires a management 
mechanism for the asymmetric keys such as a certificate authority [30]. 
b. Unencrypted Management Communication Solution  
Enforcing confidentiality and preventing attackers from reading 
management messages requires management messages be encrypted. After the 
authentication procedure is completed, the common key agreed upon by the 
authenticated parties may be used to enforce confidentiality. Thus, the TEK 
exchange and all messages that follow can be encrypted.  However, either a 
security association for every management connection or a global management 
security association is required to eliminate Authorization Keys having to be 
frequently updated.  
Encryption should be enforced as early as possible. A Diffie-
Hellman (DH) key management protocol may be used to mitigate this 
vulnerability, a vector for Man-in-the-Middle attacks. Through this protocol the 
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initial management messages are protected. The DH protocol is a symmetric 
encryption that includes key exchanges between the MS and the BS.  
The following equations express this protocol. For these, ‘a’ is the 
private key of the MS, ‘b’ is the private key of the BS, ‘P’ and ‘G’ global variables, 
and ‘G’ is a primitive root of ‘P’. Thus, the public keys of the MS and the BS are 
correspondingly: 
PKMS= G^a modP  
PKBS = G^b mod P  
In the following diagram the four steps of the DH protocol are 
depicted: 
 
Figure 32.  DH four step key exchange protocol, from [29]. 
It can be algebraically proven that Ka and Kb are equal. Thus, the 
encryption scheme used is symmetric. The encryption process that is used is 
depicted in the following diagram and it is consists of a bitwise XOR operation of 
plaintext and the key generated by DH. 
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Figure 33.  Encryption process by using the key generated by DH algorithm, from 
[29] 
In this manner, the management messages may be encrypted even 
before the authentication process is completed [29]. 
c. Shared Keys in Multi- and Broadcast Service 
If a shared key is used for the Multi and Broadcast Service, every 
member can potentially forge messages. Scientists proposed solutions to secure 
the update command message of key distribution so that attackers have no 
access to messages. Three distinct approaches are analyzed [30]. 
(1) Avoid broadcast key updates. This approach 
suggests using a unicast method of sending the updates to individual MS. Then 
the key is encrypted using the KEK which is available only to the distinct MS. 
Before the GTEK expires the BS sends the update command to each MS. This 
procedure is depicted in the left part of Figure 34 showing the similarity with 
GKEK update command message. 
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Figure 34.  Potential solution for secure GTEK transmission, from [30]. 
(2) Public key cryptography. In this approach the BS 
broadcasts the GTEK update message, which is encrypted by the shared key 
GKEK and then signed by the private key of the BS. Then, each MS, after 
receiving the message, verifies the signature of the BS and then decrypts it by 
using the GKEK. This procedure is depicted in the right part of Figure 34. 
(3) GTEK hash chain. In this approach the BS generates 
a random number, the GTEK0. By applying a one-way hash function, f, to the 
previous GTEK value, each subsequent GTEK value is produced, as follows [29]: 
GTEK0 = random () 
GTEK1 = f (GTEK0) 
GTEK2 = f (GTEK1) 
GTEKn = f (GTEKn-1) 
The only key in this chain authentication that cannot be 
authenticated is the last one, the GTEKn that has to be sent securely to every 
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MS. One secure way is for the BS to send GTEKn through a unicast update 
message of the GKEK encrypted by the KEK.  
After receiving the new GTEK, the MS uses the one-way 
hash function to verify its integrity. If the authentication is positive, the new GTEK 
overwrites the previous one. Otherwise, the message is discarded and a new 
GTEK is requested by the MS, as depicted in the following figure.  
 
Figure 35.  GTEK hash chain solution, from [30]. 
In the next chapter an evaluation of these solutions will be 
provided to understand how effective they may be for making communications 




IV. ANALYSIS OF SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS AND SECURITY 
IMPACT ON MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS 
Chapter III presented an analysis of security issues in the three WAN 
wireless technologies of interest to us and a few solutions to address their 
security concerns. In this chapter an evaluation of these solutions is provided. A 
discussion of how the security issues may affect military communications 
completes the chapter. 
A. UMTS SECURITY SOLUTIONS EVALUATIONS 
1. Defense Strategy Model Evaluation 
The defense strategy model [21] aims to eliminate some of security 
access domain vulnerabilities. The two main security targets that the solution is 
concentrated on are the mutual authentication between the user and the network, 
and the establishment of the cipher and integrity keys after a successful 
authentication. In the proposed model, concern about the SN authentication is 
addressed. The introduction of the nonce, R1, enforces successful identification 
of the HN. The introduction of the nonce, R2, enforces successful identification of 
the SN. The successful authentications are also based on the fact that the 
messages exchanged among the three entities, the MS, the SN, and the HN, are 
encrypted. Specifically, the authentication between the MS and the HN is 
enforced by using the shared key, KHM; between the HN and the SN by using 
the public key of SN; between the SN and the MS by using the private key of the 
SN; and between the MS and the SN by using the public key of the SN. The 
asymmetric encryption schemes that are used, even if they are slower, offer 
better security.  In this manner, the MS and the HN recognize the SN and make 
sure that the messages they exchange come through the legitimate SN and not a 
malevolent attacker. Thus, the Man-in-the-Middle attacks, along with the DoS 
attacks, are prevented in the network, enforcing confidentiality and integrity of the 
exchanged messages [21]. 
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2. Enhanced Enhancement Mobile Security and User 
Confidentiality for UMTS (EMSUCU) Evaluation 
The Enhanced EMSUCU [18] applies three measures beyond those taken 
by the EMSUCU solution to enforce additional security. The first is the 
introduction of a temporary key, TK, instead of using the secret key, K; the latter 
is only used to generate a new temporary key every time an EMSUCU is 
executed. Moreover, the key, TK, is transferred securely on the radio access 
since it is encrypted. The second measure is that of using CK and IK one last 
time before they expire to initiate the AKA procedure; this provides protection to 
the messages exchanged during the AKA procedure. The third is the establishing 
the size of 128 bits for CK, IK, and TK and the size of 256 bits for K, thereby 
making it more difficult for an adversary to attack. These three countermeasures 
prevent cipher-text and known-plaintext attacks that an adversary could leverage 
to retrieve the keys, as it is described in Chapter III. By protecting K, forward and 
backward security is enforced, since K’s disclosure would have allowed the 
attacker the ability to decrypt past and future communication. 
Furthermore, the Enhanced EMSUCU maintains the advantages of simple 
EMSUCU. The IMSI and the TMSI are sent encrypted, providing user 
confidentiality. These countermeasures prevent Man-in-the-Middle and 
rogue/fake BS station attacks [18]. 
3. Secure-Authentication Key Agreement Protocol 
The S-AKA [20] provides protection from rediretion attacks. The Location 
Area Identity, which identifies the location of the BS, is sent in clear in the UMTS 
AKA. An attacker can exploit it and mount a redirection attack to forward traffic 
toward a fraudulent BS. The attacker can gain access to the messages then. In 
the S-AKA protocol the LAI is protected. Using a message authentication code, 
the S-AKA enforces integrity protection. Thus, the LAI of the BS can not be 
compromised  and the HN can verify that the  BS is a legitimate one. Preventing 
redirection attacks offers the user protection against being charged for services 
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through a network other than his home network. Moreover, it prevents the user 
from being compromised since it protects him from being connected to a network 
that has weak or no encryption.    
Additionally, the S-AKA offers resistance to manin-the-middle attacks. The 
new encryction key, PLK, is introduced in case the MS is connected to a GSM 
BSS. The MS encrypts the payload with the PLK and provides communication 
confidentiality with the SGSN. Thus, there is no risk of messages being 
eavesdropped on or modified over the wireless network. 
Even if it is not a security advantage, it should be noted that S-AKA 
reduces bandwidth consumption. The HLR/AuC, after authenticating the MS, 
sends to the SGSN a delegation key, DK, which enables the SGSN to 
authenticate the MS in future communications without having to interact with the 
HLR. In this way, the messages exchanged between the SGSN and the HLR are 
reduced and thereby the bandwidth consumption, as well [20]. 
B. LTE SECURITY SOLUTIONS EVALUATIONS 
1. Security Enhanced Evolved Packet System–Authentication 
Key Agreement 
In the Security Enhanced EPS-AKA (SE EPS-AKA) [27], the IMSI is 
encrypted using the public key of the HSS, PKH. The encryption provides 
security for the IMSI, making sure the IMSI can’t be disclosed to an adversary. 
Using encryption, the Man-in-the-Middle attacks that were analyzed in Chapter II 
are not possible any more. Moreover, via IMSI encryption protection, the 
subscriber location remains confidential.   
The serving network identity, SNID, in SE EPS-AKA is encrypted using the 
PKH when it is transmitted thereby avoiding being disclosed to adversaries. 
Since it is encrypted, the attacker cannot derive the SNID and cannot mount a 
false BS attack or fraudulent network attack. 
In the SE EPS-AKA, the SQN is not needed to maintain the freshness of 
the AV. Even if the attacker eavesdrops on the messages exchanged between 
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the MME and the HSS or the UE, he cannot decrypt the messages. Thus, the 
public encryption that is enforced in SE EPS-AKA provides more security and 
eliminates the need for the SQN functionality [27].   
2. Ensured Confidentiality Authentication and Key Agreement II 
(EC-AKA2) Protocol 
The Ensured Confidentiality Authentication and Key Agreement II protocol 
[26] offers confidentiality. The IMSI is not sent in the clear at all. It is encrypted, 
instead, with the public key of the HSS, making the IMSI’s disclosure impossible. 
Moreover, when disclosure of the UE identification to MME is needed, the UE 
has to send his IMSI; however, EC-AKA2 suggests using the last TMSI instead of 
sending the IMSI or IMEI, protecting both values. This enforcement prevents 
attackers from compromising the IMSI or mounting certain DoS attacks. 
When a new eNB has no access to an old eNB it requests the associating 
user‘s IMSI. EC-AKA2 adopts a new technique compared to EC-AKA and EPS-
AKA. It forces the user to re-run the EC-AKA2 instead of sending the IMSI. This 
technique provides further IMSI protection. The attacker is not able to exploit the 
IMSI-TMSI relationship to track of the user movement. In this way, false BS 
attacks become infeasible and confidentiality is enhanced. 
Another functionality that EC-AKA2 offers is the TMSI reassignment for all 
users in a cell. This functionality further prevents an attacker from linking an IMSI 
to its associated TMSI. Even if the attacker knows the previous MSI/TMSI 
relationship, after TMSI reassignment the attacker will have no idea about the 
new relationship. The period of reassignment is specifically defined by the 
protocol designer. 
Last, the Service Network Identity, SNID, is protected in EC-AKA2. The 
SNID is encrypted in the first message sent from the UE to the MME. Then the 
MME sends the SNID, encrypted by PKH, and the encrypted message from the 
UE that also includes the SNID to the HSS. The HSS decrypts the received 
message and compares the SNIDs to verify the authentication of the SN. The 
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HSS sends back a message to the MME encrypted with the public key of the 
legitimate SN. Even if an attacker impersonates a legitimate SN, he does not 
have the SN’s private key to decrypt the last message received from HSS, 
preventing authentication. This functionality is feasible with EC-AKA, too, and 
enhances secure authentication of the SN, preventing false base station attacks 
[26]. 
C. WIMAX SECURITY ENHANCEMENT 
1. Management Messages Authentication Solution Evaluation 
According to [30] the use of CMAC or Short HMAC provides security to 
management messages exchanged and reduces the size of the message to the 
minimum possible of 104 bits. In this way the effectiveness of the protocol is 
overly affected. 
Using symmetric encryption, the broadcasted messages are protected and 
the encryption is still fast maintaining the protocol to a sufficiently effective level. 
Moreover, the protocol is secured from attackers other than group members. 
The asymmetric encryption may be the last option if the designers 
consider the protocol performance essential. The key management mechanism 
needed along with the time it takes for the asymmetric encryption to be executed 
make it less than the most attractive solution. 
All three solutions provide integrity for the protocol. The advantages are 
many, since there are a lot of cases in which an attacker could benefit by an 
unauthenticated message and interrupt the communication between the MS and 
the BS. By protecting the management messages, a potential attacker is 
prevented from generating an unauthenticated message, thereby waking up the 
MS to receive traffic. Thus, the attacker can no longer keep the MS active and 
stress its battery, nor can an attacker use the relevant message to control the 
transmitting power of the MS. In this way, the adversary is prevented from setting 
the transmitting power either to a minimal level such that the MS cannot be 
recognized by the BS, or to an excessive level to stress its battery. By 
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authenticating the message that advertises the neighboring BS, the attacker has 
no option of omitting or modifying information about such neighbors or even 
advertising a non-existing BS to an MS [30].  
2. Unencrypted Management Communication Solution Evaluation 
The Diffie-Hellman protocol [9, 29, 30] that is used to enforce 
confidentiality is a symmetric encryption scheme: that means it is fast compared 
to the asymmetric schemes. Second, it protects the management messages from 
being disclosed to an adversary. In this way, useful information that could be 
used to mount an attack is not made available to an attacker. For example, by 
eavesdropping on bandwidth-related management messages an attacker may 
surmise the importance of a particular user by recognizing how much bandwidth 
the user is allocated. By encrypting authorization requests, which include user 
security capabilities, the adversary would no longer have insight into which user 
needs more support or stronger protection. Another advantage of encryption is 
that it prevents disclosure of the user and connection QoS parameters. Since the 
QoS parameters include information about service and user priorities, an attacker 
could otherwise get insight into mission priorities if the messages were not 
encrypted. Last, message encryption during the initial ranging procedure protects 
the user from being tracked. Encrypting the messages during ranging leaves no 
loophole for the attacker to calculate the location of the user. Thus, the attacker 
is denied all the useful information he used to derive by eavesdropping on 
unencrypted messages [9, 29, 30]. 
3. Shared Keys in Multi- and Broadcast Service Solution 
Evaluation 
The solutions provided in [28, 30] help to avoid attacks by addressing a 
vulnerability exposed when the BS sends a message to every member of the 




message to update the GTEK, the message sent from the BS to a distinct MS 
can only be decrypted by the legitimate MS. Nobody else knows the KEK but the 
individual MS. 
Further, by using public key cryptography, the BS signs the encrypted 
GKEK update message using the newly updated GTEK. In this way, the 
protection of a legitimate BS is enforced since the MS can verify that the BS that 
sent the message was the legitimate one. 
Using the GTEK hash chain, all of the keys in chain authentication are 
authenticated except the last one. The last key, GTEKn, though, is protected 
since it is sent encrypted through the unicast GKEK update message. 
Each of these solutions offers protection against a potential group member 
attacker that wants to fool the rest of the group members. The attacker cannot 
impersonate a BS. Moreover, the attacker is prevented from using the GTEK 
update command message to mislead the rest of the group members; the 
attacker cannot distribute a falsely modified GTEK to the other members any 
more. Thus, the risk of members accepting a GTEK modified by the attacker and 
being unable to decrypt traffic from the legitimate BS is eliminated [28, 30]. 
D. SECURITY SOLUTIONS’ CONTRIBUTION TO MILITARY 
COMMUNICATIONS 
In military communications, a significant effort is made to improve not only 
the quality of service but also the security provided. The communications security 
is vital in military communications.  
The communications demand on the battlefield now is not just voice 
communication through radio, as it used to be a few years ago. Today, military 
forces desire various fidelity pictures, video, and command and control systems 
while on the move, and all the messages that support these functionalities must 
be exchanged in a secure manner.  Secure communications can make the 
difference between a mission success and a mission failure, life and death. 
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Military communication must ensure that the data exchanged are 
protected with respect to confidentiality and integrity, that only authorized people 
have access to the resources and that the military entities have critical data 
available at any time.  
One of the most important aspects of security in military communications 
is mutual authentication. It has to be ensured that there is no chance of a user 
registering to a rogue BS. During mutual authentication, both the BS and the SS 
prove that they know the shared secret. In the event of a rogue BS, all data traffic 
going through that BS might be compromised to a potential attacker. 
Another important aspect of mission critical communication is encryption. 
Though there may be cases in commercial communications where disclosure of 
data has a limited effect on the user or the network, with military communications 
information disclosure may be exploitable from the enemy in future missions 
even if the information has no meaning at that time. For example, methods of 
operation may be revealed that might be exploited in future engagements. 
Another aspect that may be harmful in military communications is the 
disclosure of authorization requests. The authorization requests include the 
subscriber’s capabilities. The attacker may assume which subscribers handle 
sensitive data by checking those subscribers requiring strong protection 
capabilities. 
The disclosure of management messages is another weakness that may 
pose a great impact in military communications. An eavesdropper can collect 
valuable information about subscriber’s station capabilities by management 
messages sent in the clear. Moreover, from QoS parameters of subscribers and 
connections, an attacker may get an insight about service and user priorities that 
may reflect the mission priorities [33].   
More pertinent to the three technologies upon which this thesis focuses, 
IMSI catching is one of the issues of concern. Captured IMSI information may 
make it possible for an attacker to mount many distinct DoS attacks. The DoS 
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attacks may consume bandwidth, modify initial security capabilities of the MEs, 
or authentication parameters preventing network and user authentication, or 
simply making a lot of authentication requests and exhausting the serving 
network management resources and the HSS’s computational power. 
Another important area of risk is user equipment tracking. The attacker 
can track the user’s temporary or permanent ID and use it to backtrack along the 
user’s entire trace. Moreover, the attacker can impersonate a serving network 
and have access to encrypted data. This weakness is really important for military 
troops because it can disclose their location to the enemy [26]. 
The fact that the SN is not authenticated in 3G networks can lead to Man-
in-the-Middle attacks in both wireless and wired networks that are potentially 
harmful for military communications. DoS attacks may make the system 
unavailable to the user, adversely impacting command and control actions. This 
becomes harmful for troops that are in battlefield and suddenly lose 
communication.  
The potential CK, IK and secret key, K, disclosure is another important 
weakness. An attacker may gain access to a significant amount of data if the CK 
and IK are disclosed. The worst scenario, though, is disclosure of the secret key 
that compromises the security of past and future communications. This could be 
devastating for operations. 
Leveraging unencrypted and unauthenticated management messages, the 
attacker might harm communications. In the case of unencrypted messages, the 
adversary can eavesdrop on the critical information, derive useful information, 
impersonate an MS, or mount Man-in-the-Middle and DoS attacks. Then the 
attacker can relate the derived information with the user equipment, which is 
even worse in military communications. In the case of unauthenticated 
messages, the communication between the MS and the BS will be disclosed to 
the attacker, giving a big advantage to the attacker in military communications. 
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Each of these issues and examples highlights the criticality of the security 
of 3G, LTE and WiMAX, as many weaknesses may impact mission outcome. 
Thus, the solutions included in the second part of this chapter may become really 
beneficial for military communications.  
After having analyzed some of the security weaknesses and attacks that 
these wireless technology face, a few solutions that may provide some degree of 
countermeasure were provided. The effect that these issues may have on 
military communications and the importance of security in those communications 
was depicted.  
After having analyzed the vulnerabilities and solutions suggested in the 
literature as countermeasures to the deficiencies of the three cellular 
technologies, the evaluation of the methods and the impact on military 
communications was presented in this chapter. The final chapter summarizes the 
results and enumerates the security areas that were not addressed in this thesis, 
identifying areas for further study.  
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V. ANALYSIS OF SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS AND 
COMMERCIAL OFF THE SHELF (COTS) PRODUCTS 
A. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
All the solutions provided, analyzed and evaluated in the previous 
chapters enforced security in wireless communications. Attacks such as Man-in-
the-Middle, replay and Denial-of-Service were mitigated through these solutions. 
Through such solutions military communications can become more secure by 
protecting exchanged messages, subscriber identity and configuration 
capabilities and location information. Thus, the solutions provided can have a 
beneficial impact on military communications that can be critical for mission’s 
success.  
1. UMTS Security Solutions Performance 
The solutions for UMTS security discussed in Chapter III provide methods 
to counter many vulnerabilities.  
The first UMTS solution enforced mutual authentication between the user 
and the network to assure successful identification of the servicing and home 
networks.  Moreover, it established cipher and integrity keys after successful 
authentication was completed. It also enforced encryption in communications 
between the mobile station and the network management entities. This solution 
offered security against Man-in-the-Middle and DoS attacks by enforcing 
confidentiality and integrity of the exchanged messages. 
The Enhanced Enhancement Mobile Security and User Confidentiality for 
UMTS (Enhanced EMSUCU) protocol introduced a temporary key to protect the 
shared secret key when it is transferred on the radio access. The messages 
exchanged during initial steps of the AKA procedure were secured using the 
encryption and integrity keys to initiate the procedure before those keys expire. It 
also made the keys more secure by increasing the size of the keys used. In this 
way cipher-text and known-plaintext attacks were prevented. Furthermore, user 
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confidentiality was enforced by transferring the IMSI and TMSI encrypted thereby 
preventing man-in-the-middle and rogue/fake BS station attacks. 
The Secure-Authentication Key Agreement protocol (S-AKA) offered 
protection against redirection attacks by enforcing integrity protection to the 
Location Area Identity of the BS. In this way, the legitimacy of the BS was 
established. Additionally, the protocol, by introducing a new key, enforced 
confidentiality to protect messages against eavesdropping or modification in the 
event a GSM BS is also involved in communications session. In this way, it 
prevented Man-in-the-Middle attacks over the GSM segments which normally 
provide no encryption. 
2. LTE Security Solutions Performance 
The Security Enhanced Evolved Packet System – Authentication Key 
Agreement (SE EPS-AKA) prevents man-in-the-middle attacks and subscriber 
location disclosure by encrypting the IMSI. Additionally, it prevents an attacker 
from mounting a false BS attack or fraudulent network attack by encrypting the 
Service Network Identity (SNID). 
The Ensured Confidentiality Authentication and Key Agreement II (EC-
AKA II) protocol prevents Man-in-the-Middle and DoS attacks by encrypting the 
IMSI in the first step of the authorization process and using a Temporary Mobile 
Subscriber Identity (TMSI) instead of the IMSI and IMEI in the remaining 
authentication steps. It prevents false base station attacks by encrypting the 
SNID. Additionally, it protected the IMSI/TMSI relationship and prevented false 
BS attacks by rerunning the EC-AKA II protocol whenever an eNB lost 
connection and had to reconnect and by periodically reassigning TMSIs for all 
users in a cell. 
3. WiMAX Security Solutions Performance  
The CMAC or Short HMAC algorithms were proposed to provide integrity 
since they authenticate the management messages. The symmetric encryption, 
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with the key shared among all member groups, or asymmetric encryption, using 
the private key of the BS, were two alternative ways of authenticating the 
management messages. Both solutions prevented data messages between an 
MS and the BS from being intercepted thereby inhibiting Man-in-the-Middle and 
DoS attacks. 
The Diffie-Hellman symmetric encryption scheme was used to encrypt 
management messages. It prevented attackers from eavesdropping on 
messages that include user security capabilities, QoS parameters or bandwidth 
related information. In this way, it prevented MS impersonation, user tracking, 
and Man-in-the-Middle and DoS attacks. 
Similarly, the unicast message method ensured that only the legitimate 
MS could decrypt the message containing the Group Key Encryption Key 
(GKEK) update. The public key cryptography ensured that an MS could verify the 
legitimacy of the BS that sent it the GKEK update message. The Group Traffic 
Encryption Key (GTEK) hash chain authentication also ensured that the GTEK 
keys used to update the GKEK message were generated and transferred 
securely. Each of these solutions would provide protection against a potential 
group member attacker trying to modify the GTEK and making the rest of the 
group members unable to decrypt traffic received from a legitimate BS. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
The thesis addressed issues having to do with authentication, 
authorization, and key distribution. Its focus was mostly restricted to security 
enforced through various authentication protocols and techniques to enforce the 
confidentiality and integrity of messages exchanged across the radio interface. 
However, other areas bear consideration; following are a few topics that should 
be explored in further studies. 
Mobile Virtual Private Networks (MVPNs) are commonly used, especially 
in military communications. MVPNs are network configurations by which mobile 
users can have access to the home network resources as “locally-connected 
 86 
users” even if they change location. MVPNs are based on the functionality of 
VPNs that use tunneling, authentication and encryption to provide a virtual local-
access line to the hosting network over which entities communicate securely. 
MVPNs add benefit over fixed VPNs as they provide continuous service to the 
users even though the mobile user transitions across different technologies or 
connections. The logical IP address assigned by the MVPN service supports 
mobility as the user device may roam and switch across different technologies 
and networks while the service maintains the logical IP-address association to 
the actual IP-address, such as through the use of Mobile-IP, allocated to the host 
as it traverses different network segments. This offers desired flexibility to mobile 
users.  
Another useful technique that offers benefit is multilayered security. The 
security is applied in layers by which security provisions or protocols are applied 
in tandem to analyze and enforce security. The security objectives, or 
dimensions, such as authentication, non-repudiation, confidentiality and integrity, 
are addressed to counter threats and potential attacks. One example of 
concerted efforts to provide for multilayered security is the ITU-T X.805 standard, 
which provides a multilayered, end-to-end, network-security framework across 
eight security dimensions to defeat threats. 
Finally, efforts could be made to increase the security within the 
application layer. Adding intrusion detection systems and firewalls for gateways 
that track or control application traffic and enforce access control to specific 
applications will help to make the network less vulnerable to attacks. In summary, 
this thesis explored security issues pertinent to 3G, 4G/LTE and WiMAX 
networks; analyzed known vulnerabilities for each of these wireless technologies; 
assessed a few proposed solutions to make these technologies more secure and 
discussed the benefits of enforcing cellular security for military communications. 
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